Workflow Modeling Using Finite Automata by Khemuka, Atul Ravi
University of South Florida
Scholar Commons
Graduate Theses and Dissertations Graduate School
11-7-2003
Workflow Modeling Using Finite Automata
Atul Ravi Khemuka
University of South Florida
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarcommons.usf.edu/etd
Part of the American Studies Commons
This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Graduate School at Scholar Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Graduate
Theses and Dissertations by an authorized administrator of Scholar Commons. For more information, please contact scholarcommons@usf.edu.
Scholar Commons Citation
Khemuka, Atul Ravi, "Workflow Modeling Using Finite Automata" (2003). Graduate Theses and Dissertations.
https://scholarcommons.usf.edu/etd/1406
Workflow Modeling Using Finite Automata 
 
 
by 
 
 
 
Atul Ravi Khemuka 
 
 
 
 
 
A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment 
of the requirements for the degree of 
Master of Science in Industrial Engineering 
Department of Industrial and Management System Engineering 
College of Engineering 
University of South Florida 
 
 
 
 
 
Major Professor: Ali Yalcin, Ph.D. 
      
Co Major Professor: William Miller, Ph.D. 
 
 Suresh Khator, Ph.D. 
      
 
 
Date of Approval: 
November 7, 2003 
 
 
 
Keywords: supervisory control theory, task, control-flow dependencies, state avoidance, 
string avoidance 
 
© Copyright 2003 , Atul Ravi Khemuka 
 
 i 
 
 
 
 
 
Table of Contents 
 
List of Tables ................................................................................................................. iv 
List of Figures................................................................................................................. v 
Abstract ........................................................................................................................ vii 
Chapter 1. Introduction ................................................................................................... 1 
1.1 Task............................................................................................................... 2 
1.1.1 Types of Tasks ................................................................................ 3 
1.2.2 Task Structure ................................................................................. 4 
1.2 Task Dependency .......................................................................................... 6 
1.3 Types of Control-flow Dependencies............................................................. 6  
1.3.1 Strong-causal Dependency .............................................................. 6 
1.3.2 Weak-causal Dependency................................................................ 7 
1.3.3 Precedence Dependency.................................................................. 8 
1.4 Organization of the Thesis ............................................................................. 8 
 
Chapter 2. Literature Review .......................................................................................... 9 
2.1 Transaction Models ....................................................................................... 9 
2.2 Workflow Management System................................................................... 10 
2.3 Process Definition Tool ............................................................................... 13 
2.3.1 Formal Modeling and Specification of Workflows ........................ 13 
2.3.2 Task Specification......................................................................... 13 
2.3.3 Dependencies ................................................................................ 14 
2.3.4 Analysis of Workflow ................................................................... 15 
2.3.4.1 Validation....................................................................... 15 
2.3.4.2 Verification..................................................................... 16                   
2.4 Workflow Enactment Tool........................................................................... 16 
2.4.1 Enforcing Dependency.................................................................. 16 
2.4.2 Workflow Safety........................................................................... 17 
 
Chapter 3. Motivation and Problem Statement .............................................................. 19 
3.1 Objectives.................................................................................................... 20 
 
Chapter 4. Finite Automata Theory .............................................................................. 21 
4.1 Finite Automata .......................................................................................... 21 
4.1.1 Example ........................................................................................ 22 
4.2 Avoidance Problem ..................................................................................... 22 
 ii 
4.2.1 State Avoidance ............................................................................ 23 
4.2.2 String Avoidance........................................................................... 23 
4.3 Modeling Workflow Specifications.............................................................. 24 
4.3.1 Example: Airline Example ............................................................ 25 
4.3.2 Workflow Model........................................................................... 26 
4.3.3 Identifying Illegal States and Illegal Events................................... 28 
4.3.4 Removing Illegal States and Disabling Illegal Events.................... 29 
4.4 Analysis of Workflow Model....................................................................... 30 
4.4.1 Logical Correctness of the Model.................................................. 31 
4.4.2 Inconsistent Dependency Specification.......................................... 34 
4.4.2.1 Formalism for Checking Inconsistency ........................... 35 
4.4.2.2 Checking for Inconsistent Workflow Specification ......... 36 
4.4.3 Testing for Safety.......................................................................... 39 
4.5 Chapter Summary........................................................................................ 40 
 
Chapter 5. Supervisory Control Theory......................................................................... 43 
5.1 Formal Definition ........................................................................................ 44 
5.1.1 Basic Supervisory Control Problem (BSCP).................................. 46 
5.1.1.1 Solution of BSCP............................................................ 46 
5.1.1.2 Controllability Theorem (CT) ......................................... 47 
5.1.2 Basic Supervisory Control Problem-Nonblocking (BSCP-NB)...... 48 
5.1.2.1 Solution of BSCP-NB..................................................... 48 
5.1.2.2 Nonblocking Controllability Theorem (NTC) ................. 49 
5.2 Applying Supervisory Control to Workflow Processes ................................ 50 
5.2.1 Uncontrolled Process Model.......................................................... 51 
5.2.2 Admissible Language.................................................................... 52 
5.2.3 Computation of Lam ....................................................................... 53 
5.2.3.1 Control Specification Models.......................................... 54 
5.2.3.1.1 Strong-causal Dependency ............................... 57 
5.2.3.1.2 Weak-causal Dependency................................. 58 
5.2.3.1.3 Precedence Dependency ................................... 59 
5.2.3.2 Specification Model for Airline Example........................ 60 
5.2.3.3 Recognizer for CamL
­ ......................................................... 63 
5.2.3.4 Existence of Supervisor ................................................. 65 
5.2.4 Supervisor..................................................................................... 66 
 
Chapter 6. Case Study................................................................................................... 68 
6.1 Online Bookstore......................................................................................... 68 
6.1.1 Process Definition ......................................................................... 70 
6.1.2 Online Bookstore Workflow.......................................................... 72 
6.1.3 Uncontrolled Process Model.......................................................... 73 
6.1.4 Specification Model ...................................................................... 73 
6.1.5 Supervisor and Inconsistency ........................................................ 73 
6.1.5.1 Inconsistent Supervisor................................................... 74 
6.1.5.2 Modified Supervisor ....................................................... 76 
 iii 
 
Chapter 7. Conclusion and Future Research .................................................................. 80 
7.1 Contribution ................................................................................................ 80 
7.2 Conclusion .................................................................................................. 81 
7.3 Future Research........................................................................................... 82 
 
References .................................................................................................................... 83 
Appendices ................................................................................................................... 87 
Appendix A: Types of Dependencies [5] ........................................................... 88 
Appendix B: Standard Algorithm for • C [4] ..................................................... 90 
B.1. Step 0 ............................................................................................. 90 
B.2. Step 1 ............................................................................................. 90 
B.3. Step 2 ............................................................................................. 91 
B.3.1 Step 2.1............................................................................. 91 
B.3.2 Step 2.2............................................................................. 91 
B.4. Step 3 ............................................................................................. 91 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 iv 
List of Tables 
 
Table 1.1.  Example Workflow ....................................................................................... 2 
Table 1.2.  is  and Corresponding 
'
is  ............................................................................... 8 
Table 4.1.  ei and Corresponding sj ................................................................................ 29 
Table 5.1.  Dependency Specification ........................................................................... 54  
Table 5.2.  Complementary States................................................................................. 54 
Table 5.3.  Incompatible States and Illegal Strings ........................................................ 57 
Table 5.4.  Control Pattern ............................................................................................ 67 
Table 6.1.  Control Pattern ............................................................................................ 77 
Table A.1.  Dependencies Classification ....................................................................... 89 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 v 
List of Figures 
 
Figure 1.1.    Task Structure ............................................................................................ 3  
Figure 1.2.    Types of Task Structure.............................................................................. 4 
Figure 1.3.    Types of Transactional Task....................................................................... 5 
Figure 2.1.    Workflow Management System Reference Model.................................... 11  
Figure 2.2.    A Petri Net Representation of 2PC Task Structure.................................... 14 
Figure 4.1.    Insurance Claim Process........................................................................... 22 
Figure 4.2.    State Avoidance ....................................................................................... 23 
Figure 4.3.    String Avoidance...................................................................................... 24 
Figure 4.4.    Travel Agency Systems............................................................................ 26 
Figure 4.5.    Individual Task Automata ........................................................................ 27 
Figure 4.6.    Workflow Model Gah................................................................................ 28 
Figure 4.7.    Generator Model ...................................................................................... 30 
Figure 4.8.    DES Model .............................................................................................. 32 
Figure 4.9.    Generator Model Gahg ............................................................................... 32 
Figure 4.10.  Trim Generator Gt .................................................................................... 34 
Figure 4.11.  Generator Model Gahg with Additional Dependencies ............................... 37 
Figure 4.12.  Trim Generator with Additional Dependencies ......................................... 38 
Figure 4.13.  Task with Uncontrollable Events.............................................................. 40 
Figure 4.14.  Workflow Model Gah with Uncontrollable Events .................................... 41  
 vi 
Figure 5.1.    Supervisory Control Theory ..................................................................... 43 
Figure 5.2.    Closed Loop Coupled System................................................................... 45 
Figure 5.3.    System for Closure................................................................................... 50 
Figure 5.4.    Individual Task Automata ........................................................................ 51 
Figure 5.5.    Uncontrolled Process Model (G) .............................................................. 52  
Figure 5.6.    Structure for Control Specification ........................................................... 55 
Figure 5.7.    Control Specification Model (Begin Dependency).................................... 58 
Figure 5.8.    Control Specification Model (Abort Dependency) .................................... 59 
Figure 5.9.    Control Specification Model (Commit Dependency) ................................ 60 
Figure 5.10.  Specification Model ................................................................................ 61 
Figure 5.11.  Total Specification Model (C= Ca || Cb ) ................................................... 62 
Figure 5.12.  Recognizer for Lam ................................................................................... 63 
Figure 5.13.  Supremal Sublanguage ............................................................................ 63  
Figure 5.14.  Recognizer for ­amL ................................................................................ 64 
Figure 6.1.    Online Bookstore ..................................................................................... 69 
Figure 6.2.    Online Bookstore Workflow..................................................................... 72 
Figure 6.3.     Recognizer for )/( GCcL am
­ .................................................................. 75  
Figure 6.4.     Begin on Abort........................................................................................ 75 
Figure 6.5.     Forced Commit on Abort......................................................................... 76 
Figure 6.6.    Cancel Order Task Structure..................................................................... 77  
 
 
 vii 
 
 
 
Workflow Modeling Using Finite Automata 
Atul Ravi Khemuka 
ABSTRACT 
 
A Workflow is an automation of a business process.  In general, it consists of 
processes and activities, which are represented by well-defined tasks.  These include 
‘Office Automation,’ ‘Health Care’ and service-oriented processes such as ‘Online 
Reservations,’ ‘Online Bookstores’ and ‘Insurance Claims,’ etc.  The entities that execute 
these tasks are humans, application programs or database management systems.  These 
tasks are related and dependent on one another based on business policies and rules. 
 
 With rapid increases in application domains that use workflow management 
systems, there is a need for a framework that can be used to implement these 
applications. In particular, it is essential to provide a formal technique for defining a 
problem that can be used by various workflow software product developers. 
  
In this work, a formal framework based on finite state automata that facilitate 
modeling and analysis of workflows is presented.  The workflow and its specifications 
are modeled separately as finite state automata models. We provide a general framework 
for specifying control flow dependencies in the context of supervisory control theory. We 
also identify several properties of supervisory control theory and demonstrate their use 
for conducting the analysis of the workflows.  
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
 
The work on business process reengineering and office automation in the1970s 
led to the evolution of workflow technology. Since then workflow has been a subject of 
on-going development in the traditional areas of business processes. These include office 
automation, health care, telecommunication, manufacturing etc. Workflow generally 
represents processes and activities, which are represented by well-defined tasks. These 
tasks are related and dependent on one another and are executed either by humans or 
processes such as application programs or database management systems. As an example 
of workflow, consider a computing system of hospital management and administration 
[38]. A workflow for this kind of system may consist of several tasks such as entering the 
patient data into a database, obtaining information on earlier visits and medical history, 
ascertaining insurance information, entering the medical attendant’s diagnostics, 
prescribing treatment medicine, assessing cost and billing the patient. Following are some 
of the formal definition of workflow. 
 
· A workflow is a collection of tasks organized to accomplish some business 
process [35]. 
· A workflow is a representation of a given process that is made up of well-defined 
collection of activities referred as tasks [1]. 
· The workflow management coalition (WFMC) defines a workflow as a 
computerized facilitation or automation of a business process, in whole or part 
[39]. 
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1.1 Task 
 
The most important concept of workflow is a task. A task in a workflow is a 
logical unit of work that can be processed by the processing entity. Table 1.1 shows 
common workflow, task and processing entity examples [26]. 
 
Table 1.1. Example Workflow  
Workflow Task Processing Entity 
Mail routing  Email Mailer 
Loan processing Form processing Humans, application 
software 
Order processing Form processing Humans, application 
software, DBMS 
Service order processing in 
telecommunication  
Transactions, 
Contracts 
Application system, DBMS 
   
A task is modeled as a set of externally observable states as shown in Figure 1.1. 
Typical states include: initial, indicate the start of a task execution; done, indicates the 
successful execution of all operation in a task; commit, indicate that all the operation in 
the task has been completed successfully and their effects are permanently stored in the 
system; abort signifies the failure of the execution of a task and all effects of the task be 
eliminated as if it had never been executed [28]. 
 
Each task begins executing only after begin transition is invoked. At any given 
point of time, a task can be in any of the executing states. A task moves from one state to 
another only when the transition between them is enabled. The transaction is enabled 
either by the workflow controller or by the processing entity. If the workflow controller 
enables the transition then the task is controllable. Whereas if a processing entity enables 
the transition then the task is said to be uncontrollable [42]. For example, in Figure 1.1 
the done transition between the executing state and done state is enabled by the 
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processing entity, where as the start transition is enabled by the workflow controller. A 
workflow controller or scheduler is one which is responsible for coordinating the 
execution of various tasks within a workflow [42]. Where as processing entity is any user 
or application system that is responsible for completion of task during workflow 
execution. 
 
 
Figure 1.1. Task Structure [26] 
 
1.1.1 Types of Tasks 
 
A task could be transactional or non-transactional in nature. Each of these tasks 
can be further classified as user task and application task. User tasks are manual tasks that 
involve human action or human-computer interactions. Whereas application tasks are 
automated processes that need not involve human interaction, e.g. computer programs. A 
transactional task is a task that minimally obeys the atomicity property of a transaction 
and maximally supports the ACID (Atomic Consistent Isolated Durable) property. In this 
type of task there are four externally visible states: initial, executing, committed and 
aborted as shown in Figure 1.2. An example of this type of task is a banking transaction. 
Where as non-transactional task is a task that does not support the atomicity or any of the 
ACID transactional properties. The externally visible states of a non-transactional task 
prepare 
Initial 
start 
Executing 
Abort
 
Committ
 
commit 
 
abort 
done 
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are initial, executing, failed and done as shown in Figure 1.2. Human activities are 
usually considered to be the non-transactional tasks [42]. 
 
 
Input state
Output state
State with no external data input or output
 
Figure 1.2. Types of Task Structure [26] 
 
1.1.2 Task Structure  
 
  Tasks are modeled in the workflow using task structures that represents the 
execution behavior of each task. The task structure can be defined by providing [26]. 
 
· A set of externally visible executing states of a task (e.g. initial, executing, done, 
commit, abort). 
· A set of transitions or primitives between these states (e.g. begin, pre-commit, 
abort, commit). 
· The conditions that enables these transitions (the transition conditions can be used 
to specify inter-task dependencies). 
Initial 
start 
Executing 
Failed Done 
done fail 
Non- Transactional  Task 
 
Initial 
start 
Executing 
Aborted Committed 
commit abort 
 Task 
 
Transactional
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In general, each task can have a different internal task structure. This depends 
mainly on the characteristics of the system on which task is executed and some of the 
properties of processing entity responsible for the execution of a task. A task structure 
can be transactional or non-transactional. In the workflow environment a user task or 
script is characterized by the non-transactional task structure, which has failed or done as 
final state. Whereas in transactional task structure, a task executes a sequence of 
operations, then requests a commit or abort. If a commit fails then the task is aborted. But 
this is not always the case as transactional workflow could be two-phase commit, one-
phase commit or zero-phase commit.  
 
A two-phase commit first enters prepared to commit state and if the controller 
decides to commit, the task is guaranteed to commit. Whereas in one-phase commit there 
is no prepared to commit state, it can commit or abort once the task has been executed. 
However, in zero-phase commit there is no explicit commit state, i.e. a task either 
finishes executing or fails to execute [21]. Figure 1.3 shows the two-phase commit and 
one-phase commit task structure. 
 
    
Figure 1.3. Types of Transactional Task [16] 
prepare 
Initial 
start 
Executin
g 
Abort
 
Committ
 
commi
t 
 
abort 
done 
2PC transactional task 
Initial 
start 
Executing 
Abort
 
Committ
 
commit abort 
1PC transactional task 
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1.2 Task Dependency  
 
Task dependency is a method of describing certain restrictions on the execution of 
the workflows [28]. Dependencies can be intra-task dependencies or inter-task 
dependencies. Intra-task dependencies are dependencies within the task and inter-task 
dependencies are between tasks. Following are the types of inter-task dependencies that 
exist in the workflow [1].   
 
· Control-flow Dependency: A control-flow dependency between two tasks ti and tj 
specifies the condition under which tj is allowed to enter state sj based on the state 
sti of ti. A comprehensive list of task dependencies based on the task primitives 
(begins, commit and abort) can be found in Appendix A.  
· Value Dependency: A value dependency specifies task dependencies based on the 
out put value generated by certain tasks.  
· External Dependency: These dependencies are due to some external factors such 
as time. These are also termed as temporal dependencies.  
 
1.3 Types of Control-flow Dependencies 
 
Control flow dependencies based on their precedence order and incompatible state 
can be classified into three types [1]. 
 
· Strong-causal 
· Weak-causal  
· Precedence 
 
1.3.1 Strong-causal Dependency 
 
Strong-causal dependency between two tasks ti and tj can be interpreted as tj can 
enter state js  only if ti enters state is . Thus, logically, the combination of 
'
is  and js is not 
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allowed at any given time, is  and their corresponding 
'
is  are shown in Table 1.2. 
Moreover in order to enforce the dependency, is  must precede
'
js . For Example, a 
business rule that states that the purchasing department is allowed to order an item only if 
the inventory falls below a certain level. 
 
· Incompatible state ( 'is , js ) 
· Precedence order: is  <= js  
· Example: Begin Dependency 
· Begin Dependency (tj BD ti): task tj cannot begin execution until task ti has begun 
 
1.3.2 Weak–causal Dependency 
 
 Weak-causal dependency between two tasks, ti and tj can be interpreted as, tj must 
enter state js  if ti enters state is . Thus, logically, the combination of is  and 
'
js  is not 
allowed at any given time. The weak-causal type specifies the sufficient condition to 
enforce the dependency. In other word if any of the two task involved in the dependency 
start execution, the other task should start execution. Thus, the combination of is  and jb  
(begin state of task j) is not an allowed terminating state. In a workflow, the weak-causal 
type can be depict a situation where a particular workflow state triggers another event.   
For example, the business rule, which states that the purchasing department is allowed to 
order items if the inventory falls below a certain level. 
 
· Incompatible state ( is ,
'
js ) 
· Precedence order: None 
· Example: Abort Dependency 
· Abort Dependency (tj AD ti): if task ti aborts then task tj aborts 
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1.3.3 Precedence Dependency 
 
  Precedence dependency between two task ti and tj can be interpreted as, ti must 
enter state is before tj enters state js  if both is and js  occur. For example, the business 
rule stating that if reordering of item requires approval from both divisional manager and 
general manager, the approval from divisional must be obtained before that of general 
manager. 
 
· Precedence order: is  <= js  
· Incompatible state: None  
· Example: Commit Dependency 
· Commit Dependency (tj CD ti): if both task ti and tj commit then the commitment 
of ti precedes the commitment of tj 
 
Table 1.2. is  and Corresponding 
'
is  [1] 
is  exi        dni        cmi        abi           
 
'
is   ini        exi        abi        cmi   
 
1.4 Organization of the Thesis 
 
 The Organization of this thesis is as follows: Chapter 1 include basic definitions 
and terminology on workflows. Chapter 2 include literature review on the current 
techniques used in workflow modeling, motivation for the research focus, specific 
problem definition and objectives of the research. Chapter 3 describes the methodology 
used to solve the problem and highlights some of the analysis techniques useful in the 
context of the workflow. Chapter 4 describes modeling workflows with uncontrollable 
events in the context of Supervisory control theory. Chapter 5 includes a case study of 
online bookstore. Chapter 6 includes contribution, conclusion and suggestions for future 
research. 
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Chapter 2 
Literature Review   
 
In the 1980s and early 1990s a lot of research was done in relation to database and 
transaction processing. The database researchers during this period attempted to use the 
transactional models to model workflows. However, these models where not practical for 
real world applications. But they can be used as a primary baseline to model workflow 
applications, and subsequently workflow management systems (WFMS) [40].  
 
This chapter is organized as follows. In Section 2.1, details are presented about 
transactional models. In Section 2.2, the concept of WFMS and requirements for real 
world applications are discussed. Section 2.3, describes the process definition tool, used 
to specify and analyze workflows. In Section 2.4, an issue concerning workflow 
enactment service, which takes care of control and execution of workflows, is addressed. 
In Section 2.5, the motivation for the research focus and specific problem definition is 
discussed. 
 
2.1 Transaction Models 
 
The concept of transaction models [11, 16] allows an application programmer to 
write applications without the need to deal with consistency and reliability in presence of 
failure and concurrent users, since transaction provides the well-known ACID properties 
[10, 16]. Traditionally, transactions are characterized by simple application logic and 
short duration activities that typically execute within a few minutes or seconds. 
Traditional transactions models are built on the concept of ACID Properties. Although 
this concept can be useful to model database applications such as airline reservation 
systems, banking systems and electronic funds transfers. It has been recognized that the 
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standard model is too restrictive for many advanced database applications [7, 10]. For 
example, in a cooperative environment, if long-duration activities are executed as atomic 
transactions, they may significantly delay the execution of shorter activities. Hence an 
extension to these models is needed to support the development of multi-system 
applications or workflows that access heterogeneous databases. Consequently, a number 
of researchers have attempted to extend the traditional transaction model to support more 
flexible transaction processing. Examples of such models are Nested Transactions [22], 
Sagas [9], ConTract [25], and ACTA [5]. 
 
A crucial limitation of the extended models is that they have been proposed with 
specific applications in mind, which limits the applicability of these models. Moreover, 
these models are geared towards processing entities that are DBMSs (database 
management systems) that provide transactional management features, not the legacy 
systems or non-DBMS systems [21]. However, the requirements for real-world 
applications (large scale multi system executing in heterogeneous, autonomous, 
distributed environment) involve multiple communication paradigms, humans and legacy 
application systems, far exceeds the capabilities provided by these products [42].  
Furthermore, they support only a little for coordinating independent tasks. Therefore, 
most of the extended models are not practical [21]. Based on these needs, the concept of 
workflow management systems was born [17, 19]. 
 
2.2 Workflow Management System 
 
Workflow management system (WFMS) is a tool to integrate humans, computer 
systems, information resources and organizational processes to provide a unified solution 
[17, 19]. Hence, the requirements of WFMS are more challenging than DBMSs. In 
WFMS, the database might comprise a part of entire solution; involve other users and 
application tasks that are non-transactional in nature. 
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In order to standardize the requirement of real word applications, the workflow 
management coalition (WFMC), founded in 1993, developed a workflow reference 
model as shown in Figure 2.1. The model outlines the architectural representation of 
WFMS. According to workflow reference model, an entire WFMS is centered on a 
workflow engine, which is responsible for enacting task execution, monitoring workflow 
state, and evaluating conditions related to inter-task dependencies [40]. 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.1. Workflow Management System Reference Model [40] 
 
A WFMS consist of several functional components.  
 
· Process definitions tool 
· Workflow enactment service 
   Process Definition  
 
Administration 
& Monitoring 
tool 
 
Workflow Client Application 
 
Other 
workflow 
Engines 
 
 
Workflow 
Engines 
Workflow Enactment 
Interface 2 
Interface 4 Interface 3 
Interface 1 
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· Administration and monitoring tool 
· Interface to interoperate with client application 
 
The process definition tool is used to specify and analyze the workflow process 
definition. Process definition contains the information regarding the tasks that are to be 
carried out, the component operation and primitives within the tasks, its starting and 
completion conditions, rules and dependencies for navigating between tasks [13]. These 
tools are used at design time. In general, the process definition tool includes the 
following. 
 
· Formalism for modeling and specification of workflows,  
· Specifying the task and information associated with it,  
· Specification of business rules (dependencies and constraints),  
· Analysis of the workflow model.  
 
The workflow enactment service provides a run-time environment, which takes 
care of the control and execution of the workflow. In general, execution of workflow 
includes enforcing all inter-task dependencies and test for workflow safety.  
 
Administration tools provide functions such as managing users, roles and security 
policy. Monitoring tools are used for tracking and reporting workflow states and data 
generation during workflow execution. All these components have application interfaces 
that provide standard means of communication between components and the workflow 
engine. The scope of this study is limited to the process definition tool and workflow 
enactment. In Sections 2.3 and 2.4 process definition tool and workflow enactment are 
described in detail. 
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2.3 Process Definition Tool  
 
A process is specified using the process definition tool. In the following Sections, 
we describe each component of process definition tool in detail. 
 
2.3.1 Formal Modeling and Specification of Workflows 
 
A formal specification provides a formal framework for modeling and analysis of 
workflows, which develops a higher confidence in the correctness of workflows. A 
number of formal modeling techniques have been proposed [1, 3, 32, 41] of which Petri 
Nets is considered to be the state-of-the-art. Van der Aalst [31] identifies three reasons 
for using Petri Nets in workflow modeling. Firstly, Petri Nets possess formal semantics 
despites their graphical nature. Secondly, instead of being purely event-based, Petri Nets 
can explicitly model states, and lastly it is a theoretical proven analysis technique.  
 
Other than Petri Nets, technique such as state chart has also been proposed for 
modeling WFMS [41]. Although state chart can model the behavior of workflow, they 
have to be supplemented with logical specification for supporting analysis. Singh et al 
[27] uses event algebra to model the inter-task dependencies and temporal logic. Attia et 
al [3] have used computational tree logic (CLT) to model tasks by providing their states 
together with significant event corresponding to the state transitions (start, commit, 
rollback etc) that may be forcible, rejectable, or delayable. 
  
2.3.2 Task Specification 
 
Some researchers [13, 29, 33, 35, 36] have treated task as a single unit which 
precludes its ability to specify certain types of dependencies such as weak-causal type, 
i.e. an activity cannot start before the completion of another activity. However, in [1, 3, 
27, 41] each task is decomposed into a number of primitives (begin, done, abort, commit) 
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and represents states in between these primitives as well. For example, Atluri and Huang 
[1] modeled task as an ordinary Petri-net as shown in Figure 2.2.        
     ai 
                                                                                                              abi 
                                                                                                            
                                                                                              fai    
     ini         bi            exi     pi         dni      
            
                 ci                cmi    
            
     
 
Figure 2.2. A Petri Net Representation of 2PC Task Structure [1] 
 
The events in the task can be controllable or uncontrollable. Atluri, Wodtke, and 
Singh [1, 27, 41] use the task structure in which all the events are controllable. However, 
Krishnakumar et al and Attia et al [3, 20] consider that the events, which are enabled by 
user or processing entities are uncontrollable and the events that are enabled by the 
scheduler are controllable. An uncontrollable event is one which cannot be prevented 
from occurring. 
 
2.3.3 Dependencies 
 
Klein [18] proposed two types of control flow dependencies: order dependencies 
e1 < e2, and existence dependencies e1        e2.  Several researchers have used this to model 
the workflow system [3, 28]. 
 
· Order dependency: e1 < e2; if e1 and e2 both occur, then e1 must precede e2.  That 
is, if e2 occur, then e1cannot occur subsequently. 
 Example: Commit Dependency. 
• 
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· Existence dependencies: e1      e2; If event e1 occurs, then event e2 must also occur. 
There is no implied ordering on the occurrences of e1 ande2. 
Example: Abort dependency. 
 
These dependencies are also termed as casual and precedence dependencies [1, 
6]. The former specifies a logical implication; the later specifies a precedence constraint. 
Atluri and Huang [1] further classify casual type dependency into weak causal and strong 
casual based on the implied logical relationship as discussed in Section 1.2. 
 
2.3.4 Analysis of Workflow 
 
Analysis in workflows is to check the process definition for errors [34]. As the 
process definition is so important, it is useful to analyze it thoroughly prior to its 
enactment. Such analysis can encompass checking the semantic correctness of a process 
definition as well as performing a simulation in order to gain insight into the process [43]. 
 
There are two types of analysis for workflow models. 
· Validation, i.e., to check that the model behaves the same as the real system. 
· Verification, i.e., to check the logical correctness of a workflow, which is the 
absence of dead locks and livelocks. 
 
2.3.4.1 Validation 
 
Validation is done by comparing the values form the model with the real system. 
The values that are compared for validation of the model are performance indicator such 
as average completion time, level of service, and utilization. Most of workflow 
management systems use simulation as a tool for validation [13, 29, 34, 36].   
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2.3.4.2 Verification 
 
Atluri [1] developed an algorithm based on reachability property of Petri Nets, to 
check for the logical correctness of the process. Whereas others [29, 34, 36] have 
checked the soundness property for the workflow model, a workflow model is sound if it 
fulfils the following three requirements.  
 
· For each token put in a place start, one (and only one) token eventually appears in 
the place end. 
· When the token appears in the place end, all the other places are empty; and 
· For each transition (task), it is possible to move from the initial state to a state in 
which the transition is enabled. 
 
The first requirement means that every task is completed successfully over a 
period of time. The second requirement means that once the task is completed, no 
reference to it remains in the system. The last requirement excludes “dead tasks”. 
 
2.4 Workflow Enactment Tool 
 
A workflow enactment tool is the heart of the workflow system. It consists of 
several functional components, which will be discussed in Section 2.4.1 and 2.4.2. 
 
2.4.1 Enforcing Dependency  
 
In traditional applications, the dependencies between different tasks are encoded 
in the program, which are enforced automatically during the execution.  However, in 
advanced applications, different tasks should not be grouped into a single program [12]. 
Thus, all dependencies cannot be encoded directly into an application program; as a 
result, they have to be specified as an additional constraint on the execution of task, 
which in turn need a separate enforcement mechanism. The enforcement mechanism, 
decides whether a task is allowed to enter certain state based on the dependencies. The 
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task is allowed to enter a particular state only if by doing so will not violate any 
dependencies [3]. 
 
Attie [3] uses event attributes to determine whether a dependency is enforceable 
or not. Each dependency is modeled as a finite state machine, which is responsible for 
enforcing the dependency. This can be done manually, or an extension of the 
computational logic tree (CLT) [8]. Attie [3] only dependencies are specified as finite 
state machines and not the tasks.  As a result, they cannot handle uncontrollable events. 
Using the concept introduce by Attie [3] more similar research has been reported [14, 27, 
28]. Wallace et al [38] also, specify both tasks and dependencies as finite state automata, 
moreover they have adapted the technique of supervisory control. 
 
2.4.2 Workflow Safety 
 
Safety is an important property in workflow analysis.  A workflow is said to be 
safe if it always terminates in one of the specified acceptable states [1]. In other words, it 
never terminates in an unacceptable state. 
 
Atluri [1] developed an algorithm that makes use of a reachability property of 
Petri nets to check for termination in unacceptable states. Van der Aalst [36, 39] has 
defined task as a single unit.  Hence the workflow has only one acceptable state i.e. final 
task.  For a workflow to be safe it should terminate in the final task, which is checked 
during the verification of workflow. Whereas [3, 28, 38] have used a scheduler in which a 
task is allowed only if it does not violate any of the dependencies and it’s on the legal 
path.  A legal path is one, which leads to one of the acceptable states.   
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In Sections 2.1 to 2.4 we have reviewed the existing methods for modeling the 
workflow process. Amongst these methods, Petri Nets is the most used technique for 
modeling and analysis of workflows. Even though Petri Nets are powerful design tools, 
they have some limitations, which make them unsuitable for modeling workflow 
problems. These limitations in context of modeling workflows are discussed in Chapter 3.  
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Chapter 3 
Motivation and Problem Statement 
 
 With rapid increases in application domains that use workflow management 
systems, there is a need for a framework that can be used to implement these 
applications. In particular it is essential to provide a formal technique for defining a 
problem that can be used by various workflow product developers. Developing a simple 
and homogeneous language, based on formal techniques is one way to facilitate the above 
requirement. In this work, we describe an architecture based on Finite Automata for 
modeling and analysis of business processes. 
 
 Despite efforts by the WFMC [39, 40], there is lack of standardization for 
workflow management particularly regarding the problem definition aspect. Workflow 
system developers use their own languages and techniques, for modeling and analysis of 
workflow processes. There may be several reasons for this; techniques available are not 
simple enough, limitations of current techniques, inability to address some of the real 
world requirements. 
 
 Due to their graphical nature and their ability to perform analytical computations, 
Petri Nets are widely used for modeling and analysis of workflows. The analysis methods 
based on Petri Nets require every reachable state to be examined after the model is 
developed. Therefore, as the system gets larger and more complex the analysis becomes 
computationally difficult or even impossible.   
 
 In Petri Net based modeling techniques for workflows, both tasks and 
dependencies are modeled as a single system, which results in a vague specification of 
the business rules. With tasks and dependencies as a single system it’s difficult to model 
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the system correctly. Furthermore, if there is a small change in the business rules the 
whole system needs to be remodeled.  
 
 Apart from standardization in problem definition and limitations of Petri Net as a 
tool for modeling workflows, the current workflow modeling techniques do not illustrate 
the concept of uncontrollable events, which are required for most of the real world 
applications. 
 
 In order to address the fore-mentioned shortcomings of current WFMS modeling 
formalisms, we propose a modeling approach based on finite automata formalism. 
Automata are basic class of DES models, which have strong theoretical and practical 
applications. Automata represent every state explicitly, tasks and dependencies can be 
modeled separately, they do not require examining of all the states for analysis and it can 
model uncontrollable events. 
 
3.1 Objectives 
 
The overall goal of this thesis is 
· To provide a comprehensive framework for modeling workflow process 
definitions. 
 
· Within this goal the objectives are, 
o Distinguish between the events enabled by processing entity 
(uncontrollable events) and workflow controller (controllable events). 
o Represent business policies described by natural languages as formal 
languages. 
o Provide logically correct and maximally permissible control structure. 
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Chapter 4 
Finite Automata Theory 
 
 In this chapter Section 4.1 provides an overview of finite automata theory; 
Section 4.2 illustrates the concepts of state avoidance and string avoidance; and in 
Section 4.3 workflow process is framed and modeled as an avoidance problem, with the 
help of an example; Section 4.4 describes the analysis techniques for workflows; Section 
4.5 is a chapter summary. 
 
4.1 Finite Automata  
 
 Finite automata (FA) is a formalism used to model discrete event systems. In FA 
models, all the states and transitions are explicitly represented and the model always 
resides in one of its finite number of states. The finite automata model is represented by 
directed graph, in which a node represents a state and an arc represents an event [4].  
 
An FA model can be formally defined by 5- tuple å= ),,,,( 0 mQqQG d Where; 
· S is a finite alphabet of event labels, 
· Q is the set of states q, 
· d : S x Q        Q is the transition function,    
· qo  is the initial state, 
· Qm is the set of marked (or final) states, Qm Í  Q 
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4.1.1 Example  
 
Figure 4.1 shows a finite automata consisting of three states (claim, under 
consideration, ready) and three events (record, pay, send letter). This network models the 
process for dealing with an insurance claim. As the claim is received, it is first recorded, 
after which either a payment is made or a letter is sent explaining the reason for rejection. 
The ready state is marked, as it is the final state of the process [43]. 
 
        
        
        
 Claim (cl)  Under consideration (uc)       Ready (re) 
 
Figure 4.1. Insurance Claim Process 
· S: {r, p, s} 
· Q: {cl, uc, re} 
· d : {(r x cl        uc), (p x uc       re), (s x uc       re)} 
· qo : {cl} 
· Qm: {re} 
 
4.2 Avoidance Problem  
 
 Avoidance problems are those problems where certain states or events of the 
system are undesirable and hence needs to be avoided. The business rules (dependencies) 
in a workflow impose certain restrictions on the behavior of the system. Restrictions 
imposed include specifying certain states or sequence of events of the system which need 
to be avoided as they violate some conditions required for the desired behavior of the 
system. Hence the business rules (dependencies) and avoidance problems are similar as 
both address the undesirable states and events of the system. 
 
Record (r) 
Pay (p) 
Send letter (s) 
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 The avoidance problem can be further classified into state avoidance and string 
(path) avoidance. Each will be discussed separately in Sections 4.2.1 and 4.2.2. 
 
4.2.1 State Avoidance 
 
 In the state avoidance problem some states of the system are not acceptable as 
they violate conditions that we wish to impose on the system [2]. These states are termed 
as illegal state. The general idea of state avoidance problems is explained with the help of 
Figure 4.2. 
 
Figure 4.2. State Avoidance [2] 
 
 Assume that the state i in Figure 4.2 is an illegal state. The illegal state i can be 
reached from n number of states by firing one of the events e3, e4, and e5 when the system 
is in state i1, i2 and i3  respectively. Hence, illegal state i should be removed and events e3, 
e4, & e5 that take the system to illegal state i should be disabled at the states i1 , i2 and i3. 
 
4.2.2 String Avoidance 
    
 In string avoidance problems some strings of the system are not acceptable as 
they violate conditions that we wish to impose on the system [2]. These strings are 
termed as illegal string. The general idea of string avoidance problem is presented in 
Figure 4.3. 
 
Initial 
i1 i2 
i Illegal 
e1 
e4 
i3 
 State 
e2 e3 e5 
e6 
i5 
i4 
i6 
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Figure 4.3. String Avoidance 
 
 In Figure 4.3, state E can be reached from state A through a number of strings 
(ACE, ABE, ADE, ACDE and AE) i.e. following a sequence of events. The objective of 
string avoidance is to avoid a string that contains an illegal event (ei). The illegal event ei 
is shown with a bold line in Figure 4.3. All the dotted strings are acceptable. Hence the 
event ei is disabled. 
 
4.3 Modeling Workflow Specifications  
 
 A workflow is a set of tasks and inter-task dependencies (business rules). Each 
task in a workflow specifies some dependencies between its events, and business rules 
add to this a set of dependencies between events of different tasks. Each task is modeled 
as finite automata; these automata are then shuffled to obtain all the reachable states of 
the workflow model G [2]. 
 
Shuffling operation is a cross product of all the states of all the automata (tasks) to 
describe the overall behavior. That is, for a system with k automata each having ni  
states, i k= 1,...  the number of states of the combined system after shuffling is n i
i
k
=
Õ
1
.  
 
G1||G2…||Gn = G 
 
A 
E 
B 
C 
D 
ei 
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Based on the inter-task dependencies we identify illegal states and illegal events, 
which are then, removed from the workflow model to get the controlled system which is 
called as Generator model. 
  
In general modeling workflow as state avoidance and string avoidance problem, 
there are three major steps. 
· Construct a workflow model,  
· Identify the illegal states and illegal events (based on the business rules),  
· Remove all the illegal states and disable all the illegal events. 
 
In the next Section a practical example is presented to illustrate the technique of 
state avoidance and string avoidance. 
 
4.3.1 Example: Airline Example  
 
Consider a travel agency that processes requests for airline and hotel reservations 
as shown in Figure 4.4. Once the flight reservation is made it cannot be canceled, but 
cancellation of a hotel is allowed. There are three tasks involved in this workflow. 
 
· Task 1 - Purchasing an airline ticket (ta), 
· Task 2 - Booking a hotel (th), and  
· Task 3 - Cancel a hotel reservation (th). 
 
Based on the booking regulation, traveler’s preferences, or economic reasons, 
certain constraints are defined between tasks in terms of following dependencies. 
 
· Booking of hotel cannot start until purchasing an airline ticket starts (ta BD th). 
· If hotel booking aborts then purchasing airline ticket must aborts too (th AD ta). 
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· Certain restriction or combinations of airline and hotels are preferred. For 
example, flight U offers a discount rate with hotel H, and flight N offers an 
upgrade package with hotel M. which in turn imposes the following constraint: 
purchasing a airline ticket must commit before that of hotel booking if both 
commit (ta CD th). 
· If purchasing of airline ticket aborts but hotel booking commits, then hotel 
booking has to be canceled. (ta BAD (th BAC tc)). 
 
 
 
Figure 4.4. Travel Agency Systems [27] 
 
4.3.2 Workflow Model 
 
 A task begins with a start event st and terminates with commit event (c), an abort 
event (a) or it doesn’t start. There is also a pre-commit event (pc) that precedes commit 
and abort events. Since the states following the terminating events and initial state are 
final states, they are marked. Both tasks ta and th are modeled as separate automata Ga 
and Gh as shown in Figure 4.5 and these automata are then shuffled to get a workflow 
model Gah = Ga || Gh in Figure 4.6. 
Purchase  
Airline Ticket 
 
Reserve a 
 Hotel  
 
 
Cancel a 
 Hotel reservation 
 
 
T1 
T2 Begin 
Commit 
 
Begin on abort 
   Abort 
Airline Ticket 
 System 
Hotel Reservation 
System 
Airline DB1 Hotel DB Airline DB2 
Access Access 
Task Submission 
Begin on  
Commit 
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ina
exa
abc cma
ca
aa
pca
faa
dna
sta
Ga 1
2
3
4 5
   
inh
exh
abh cmh
ch
ah
pch
fah
dnh
sth
Gh 1
2
3
4 5
 
Figure 4.5. Individual Task Automata 
Airline task 
· S: {sta, pca, aa, faa, ca}   
· Q: {ina, exa, dna, aba, cma} 
· d : {(sta x ina        exa), (pca x exa          dna), (aa x exa           aba), (ca x dna         cma),  
        (faa x dna          aba)} 
· qo : {ina} 
· Qm: {ina, aba, cma} 
 
Hotel task 
· S: {sth, pch, ah, fah, ch}   
· Q: {inh, exh, dnh, abh, cmh} 
· d : {(sth x inh          exh), (pch x exh         dnh), (ah x exh         abh), (ch x dnh        cmh),  
               (fah x dnh        abh)} 
· qo: {inh} 
· Qm: {inh, abh, cmh} 
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(1,1) (2,1)
(1,2)
ta
th
(3,1) (4,1) (5,1)
(1,3)
(1,4)
(1,5)
(2,2)
(4,4) (5,4)
(4,5) (5,5)
(2,3)
(2,4) (3,4)
(5,2)
(5,3)
(4,2)(3,2)
(4,3)(3,3)
(3,5)(2,5)
        Initial State
       Marked State
 
  
Figure 4.6. Workflow Model Gah  
 
4.3.3 Identifying Illegal States and Illegal Events 
 
Strong-causal and weak-causal dependencies specify incompatible states as 
described in Section 1.2, where as precedence dependency specifies a precedence order. 
Based on this specification, we classify and model strong-causal and weak-causal 
dependencies as state avoidance problems and precedence dependency as string 
avoidance problem. 
 
 For strong-causal dependency the incompatible (illegal) states is ( is ,
'
js ) and for 
weak-causal dependency the incompatible state is ( 'is , js ) and state ( is  jb ) is not an 
acceptable terminating state. Whereas to identify the illegal events for precedence 
dependency we define a pair ( js , ei) where js  is the state of task j and ei is the illegal 
event when precedence order is 'is <= js . The complete list of ei and its corresponding 
js is shown in Table 4.1. 
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Table 4.1. ei and Corresponding sj 
ei sti           pci         ci            ai, fai          
 
sj exj         dnj       cmj          abj   
 
· Dependency 1: Begin Dependency (BD): task th cannot begin execution until task 
ta has begun. 
· Incompatible or illegal state set: ( 'as , hs ) task ta is in initial state and task th is in 
execution state (1, 2). 
· Dependency 2: Abort Dependency (AD): if task th aborts then task ta aborts. 
· Incompatible or illegal state set: ( as , 'hs ) task th is in abort state and task ta is in 
commit state (5, 4) and state ( hs  ab ) is not an acceptable terminating state. 
· Dependency 3: Commit Dependency (CD): if both task ta and th commit then the 
commitment of ta precedes the commitment of th 
· Illegal event: ( hs , ea) task hotel is in done state and has an illegal event commit. 
That is, (event ca from state (3, 5)). 
 
4.3.4 Removing Illegal States and Disabling Illegal Events 
 
 In this step we remove illegal states, illegal events, all events leading to and from 
illegal state and unmark the states that are not acceptable terminating state, from the 
workflow model Gah to get the generator model Gahg as shown in Figure 4.7. 
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Figure 4.7. Generator Model  
 
 In Sections 4.1 to 4.3 we have seen how to model the process definition using 
state avoidance and string avoidance techniques based on finite automata. A process 
definition of a workflow is a blueprint of a business process, so it is vitally important that 
it does not contain errors. For example in the above model the workflow cannot reaches 
state {(1, 3), (1, 4), (1, 5)} from initial state, which is undesirable. Hence it is useful to 
analyze the process definition prior to its enactment. The next Sections highlight some of 
the analysis techniques, which are useful in the context of analysis of workflows. 
 
4.4 Analysis of Workflow Model 
 
  For workflow models, the following types of analysis are performed: (1) check 
for the logical correctness of the model, i.e. deadlocks and livelocks; (2) identifying 
inconsistency in the dependency specifications; (3) test for workflow safety i.e. to check 
whether the workflow terminates in one of the acceptable final states [1]. 
 
 In Section 4.4.1 we introduce a simple technique to check for the logical 
correctness of the model i.e. absence of deadlocks; In Section 4.4.2 we turn our attention 
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to check for the errors that can be made while the defining business rules i.e. checking for 
inconsistent dependencies; Sections 4.4.3 shows how finite automata facilitates some 
properties for the business process i.e. workflow safety.   
 
4.4.1 Logical Correctness of the Model  
 
 When a workflow model reaches an unmarked state such that no further events 
can be executed, we say that the system is deadlocked because it enters an absorbing state 
without terminating the current task. Another issue is when there is a set of states in G 
that forms a strongly connected component (i.e. these states can reach from one another) 
and no transitions going out of the set. If the system enters this set of states then we get 
what is called a livelock. Hence to check for the presence of deadlock and livelock, we 
check the trim property for the generator model. If the generator model is trim then the 
model is free from deadlocks and livelocks [4]. If the generator model is not trim then we 
calculate the trim generator to get the deadlock free model. The following definitions are 
necessary in determining the trim property of the generator model. 
 
· Definition 1: Accessible states set: ( ) ( ){ }Q q Q q qa = Î $w Îå =* ,d w 0 , i.e. the set 
of all the states that can be reached from the initial state is called the accessible 
states subset [2]. 
· Definition 2: Co-accessible state set: ( ) ( ){ }Q q Q q Qca m= Î $w Îå Î* ,d w , i.e. 
the set of all the states q from which some marked state can be reached is called 
the co-accessible states subset [2]. 
· Definition 3: Trim: The generator G is trim if it is accessible (i.e. Q=Qa) and co-
accessible (i.e. Q=Qca). 
 
Example: Figure 4.8 shows a DES model, where state q0 represents initial state and state 
q1 represents the marked state [13]. 
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q q0
1
q
2
q3
G: a
ab
e c
 
Figure 4.8. DES Model [2] 
 
For the above example: { }Q q q q q= 0 1 2 3, , , , { }Q q q q qa = 0 1 2 3, , , , { }Q q q qca = 0 1 2, , . 
Since Q is equal to Qa but not Qca, G is not trim. 
 
 To check the trim property for the airline example refer to Figure 4.9 below. All 
the states that are red in color are both accessible and co-accessible, where as states that 
are blue in color are co-accessible. 
(1,1) (2,1)
ta
th
(3,1) (4,1) (5,1)
(1,3)
(1,4)
(1,5)
(2,2)
(4,4)
(4,5) (5,5)
(2,3)
(2,4) (3,4)
(5,2)
(5,3)
(4,2)(3,2)
(4,3)(3,3)
(3,5)(2,5)
States that are both accessible and co-accessible
States that are co-accessible
 
 
Figure 4.9. Generator Model Gahg 
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Q = {(1, 1), (1, 3), (1, 4), (1, 5), (2, 1), (2, 2), (2, 3), (2, 4), (2, 5), (3, 1), (3, 2), (3, 3), 
          (3, 4), (3, 5), (4, 1), (4, 2), (4, 3), (4, 4), (4, 5),  (5, 1), (5, 2), (5, 3), (5, 5)} 
 
Qa= {(1, 1), (2, 1), (2, 2), (2, 3), (2, 4), (2, 5), (3, 1), (3, 2), (3, 3), (3, 4), (3, 5), (4, 1),  
          (4, 2), (4, 3), (4, 4), (4, 5), (5, 1), (5, 2), (5, 3), (5, 5)} 
 
Qca= {(1, 1), (1, 4), (2, 1), (2, 2), (2, 3), (2, 4), (2, 5), (3, 1), (3, 2), (3, 3), (3, 4), (3, 5), (4, 
1), (4, 2), (4, 3), (4, 4), (5, 1), (5, 2), (5, 3), (5, 4), (5, 5)} 
 
 Since Q ¹ Qa ¹ Qca, Gahg is not trim; hence there is a deadlock or livelock in the 
system. To get the deadlock free model we find a trim generator Gt. A trim generator can 
be obtained by replacing Q with Qt = Qa Ç Qca. 
 
Qt = {(1, 1), (2, 1), (2, 2), (2, 3), (2, 4), (2, 5), (3, 1), (3, 2), (3, 3), (3, 4), (3, 5), (4, 1),  
           (4, 2), (4, 3), (4, 4), (4, 5), (5, 1), (5, 2), (5, 3), (5, 5)}Ç {(1, 1), (1, 4), (2, 1), (2, 2), 
(2, 3), (2, 4), (2, 5), (3, 1), (3, 2), (3, 3), (3, 4), (3, 5), (4, 1), (4, 2), (4, 3), (4, 4), (5, 
1), (5, 2), (5, 3), (5, 4), (5, 5)} 
 
Qt ={(1, 1), (2, 1), (2, 2), (2, 3), (2, 4), (2, 5), (3, 1), (3, 2), (3, 3), (3, 4), (3, 5),  (4, 1), (4, 
2), (4, 3), (4,  4), (4, 5), (5, 1), (5, 2), (5, 3), (5, 5)} 
 
A trim generator consists of states that are both accessible and co-accessible (states 
with red color in Figure 4.9). A trim generator for the airline example is shown in Figure 
4.10. 
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Figure 4.10. Trim Generator Gt 
 
4.4.2 Inconsistent Dependency Specification 
 
  Inconsistency is a conflicting state of the system, which results because of 
contradicting dependencies. The inconsistency may be due to the following two reasons. 
(1) Customization of workflows based on user preferences. (2) The workflow 
specifications may change, e.g. designer may add new dependencies or delete some 
existing ones [1]. Below is an example to depict the inconsistencies: 
 
 In the airline example we have abort dependency, which states if hotel booking 
(ta) aborts, airline ticket must abort (th). If add two more dependencies. 
 
· if airline tickets aborts then train reservation begins (tt), 
· if train reservation commits (tt) then hotel reservation must commit (th).    
 
 According to first dependency, if (th) aborts (ta) aborts and third dependency 
specifies that (th) must commit even if (ta) aborts, which is inconsistent. Therefore, in 
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order to avoid inconsistency in the dependency specification it is important to check, sets 
of dependencies before the enactment of business process. 
 
In Section 4.4.2.1 we provide a methodology for checking inconsistent 
dependency specification; In Section 4.4.2.2 we check and the identify type of 
dependency that is inconsistent. 
 
4.4.2.1 Formalism for Checking Inconsistency 
  
 We define the following terms before we provide the methodology for how to 
check for inconsistent specifications. 
 
· Definition 4:  For strong-causal dependency between task ti and tj an incompatible 
state (iss) is defined as ( 'is , js ) and resultant state (rss) is defined as ( is , js ). 
· Definition 5:  For weak-causal dependency between task ti and tj an incompatible 
state (iss) is defined as ( is ,
'
js ) and resultant state (rss) is defined as ( is , js ). 
· Definition 6:  For precedence dependency between task ti and tj an resultant state 
(rss) is defined as ( is , js ) and illegal event (ies) is defined as (ei). 
· Definition 7:  Incompatible state set (ISS (W)): In a workflow, ISS (W) is the set 
of all incompatible states (iss). 
· Definition 8:  Resultant State Set (RSS (W)): In a workflow, RSS (W) is the set of 
all resultant states (rss). 
 
In general identifying inconsistent dependencies is a three-step procedure. 
· Step1: Determine the trim model of the workflow, 
· Step2: Check the model for inconsistent dependency specification, 
· Step3: If the dependencies specified are inconsistent, identify the types of 
dependencies that are inconsistent. 
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Step 1. The procedure to check for trim and how to get the trim model is explained in 
Section 4.6 
 
Step 2. To check the model for inconsistent dependency specification, we check the 
following condition, if it’s satisfied then all the dependencies specified are consistent.  
· "  rss : rssÎQt  
 
Step 3. To identify the type of dependency that is inconsistent, we check the following 
conditions.   
· There exists at least one incompatible-state, such that iss Î RSS (W), If this 
condition is satisfied, then there is inconsistent specification due to weak-causal 
dependency. 
· There exists at least one resultant state, such that rssÎ Q but rss Ï  Qt, If this 
condition is satisfied, then there is inconsistent specification due to strong-causal 
or precedence dependency. 
 
Note: In the airline example explained in Section 4.3 all the dependencies specified are 
consistent i.e. there is no inconsistency in the dependency specification. 
 
4.4.2.2 Checking for Inconsistent Workflow Specification 
 
 Consider an airline example with additional dependencies specified in Section 
4.4.2, which states that if airline ticket aborts (ta) hotel booking commits (tc). Due to the 
additional dependency there is one more incompatible state (4, 4), so we remove state (4, 
4) from the generator model of airline example as shown in Figure 4.7. The generator 
model for airline example with additional dependency i.e. after removing state (4, 4) is 
shown in Figure 4.11. 
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States that are both accessible and co-accessible
States that are co-accessible
States that are accessible  
Figure 4.11. Generator Model Gahg with Additional Dependencies 
 
Step 1: In this step we first check the trim property for generator model Gahg, if its trim 
that means model is deadlock free. If the generator model Gahg is not trim then we find the 
trim generator to calculate the deadlock free model. 
 
Q = {(1, 1), (1, 3), (1, 4), (1, 5), (2, 1), (2, 2), (2, 3), (2, 4), (2, 5), (3, 1), (3, 2), (3, 3), 
          (3, 4), (3, 5), (4, 1), (4, 2), (4, 3), (4, 5),  (5, 1), (5, 2), (5, 3), (5, 5)} 
Qa= {(1, 1), (2, 1), (2, 2), (2, 3), (2, 4), (2, 5), (3, 1), (3, 2), (3, 3), (3, 4), (3, 5), (4, 1),  
          (4, 2), (4, 3), (4, 5), (5, 1), (5, 2), (5, 3), (5, 5)} 
Qca= {(1, 1), (1, 4), (2, 1), (2, 2), (2, 3), (2, 5), (3, 1), (3, 2), (3, 3), (3, 5), (4, 1), (4, 2), (4, 
3), (5, 1), (5, 2), (5, 3), (5, 4), (5, 5)} 
 
Since Q ¹ Qa ¹ Qca, Gahg is not trim; hence there is a deadlock in the system. Now to 
calculate the deadlock free model we find a trim generator Gtac.  
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Qt = {(1, 1), (2, 1), (2, 2), (2, 3), (2, 4), (2, 5), (3, 1), (3, 2), (3, 3), (3, 4), (3, 5), (4, 1),  
         (4, 2), (4, 3), (4, 5), (5, 1), (5, 2), (5, 3), (5, 5)}Ç {(1, 1), (1, 4), (2, 1), (2, 2), (2, 3), 
(2, 5), (3, 1), (3, 2), (3, 3), (3, 5), (4, 1), (4, 2), (4, 3), (5, 1), (5, 2), (5, 3), (5, 4), (5, 
5)}. 
Qt = {(1, 1), (2, 1), (2, 2), (2, 3), (2, 5), (3, 1), (3, 2), (3, 3), (3, 5), (4, 1), (4, 2), (4, 3), (4,              
 5), (5, 1), (5, 2), (5, 3), (5, 5)}. 
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(2,2)
(4,5) (5,5)
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(4,3)(3,3)
(3,5)(2,5)
 
 
Figure 4.12. Trim Generator with Additional Dependencies 
 
Step 2: In this step we first find RSS (W) and then check the condition for consistency. 
Additional Dependency: if airline ticket aborts (ta) hotel booking commits (tc) 
 
Resultant State (rss): (4, 5). 
RSS (W): {(2, 2), (4, 4), (5, 5), (4, 5)} 
 
Note: States (4, 4), of RSS (W) is not a member of set Qt, hence there is an inconsistent 
dependency specification. 
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Step 3: In this step we first determine ISS (W) and IES (W) and then check the conditions 
to identify the type of inconsistent dependency. 
  
Incompatible state set (ISS (W)): {(5, 4), (1, 2), (4, 4)} 
Illegal Event set IES (W): {(event ca from state (3, 5))} 
Resultant State Set (RSS (W)): {(2, 2), (4, 4), (5, 5), (4, 5)} 
 
Note: Incompatible states (4, 4) Î RSS (W), hence according to the first condition Section 
4.4.2 we can say that the inconsistency is due to weak causal dependency. 
 
4.4.3 Testing for Safety 
 A workflow is said to be safe if it always terminates in one of the specified 
acceptable states [1]. In other words, it never terminates in an unacceptable state. An 
unacceptable state is either an illegal state or state which is not marked. That is, the 
workflow terminates in an incompatible state or it has terminated without completing all 
the tasks. 
 
Hence to check for proper termination, we check the following condition and if 
both the conditions are satisfied then we say workflow is safe. 
 
· Condition 1: iss Ï  Qg .  )(WISSiss Î" . 
· Condition 2: Generator model is deadlock free (trim). 
 
Condition 1: In state and string avoidance technique, all the incompatible states 
are removed from the generator model Gg as explained in Section 4.3.3 hence the 
incompatible state will not be a member of Qg. 
 
Condition 2: The procedure for checking deadlock and to calculate the deadlock 
free generator model is explained in Section 4.4.1. Hence by using the technique of state 
avoidance and string avoidance, we can say that if the workflow is trim it is also safe. 
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4.5 Chapter Summary 
 
In state avoidance and string avoidance techniques, each task is modeled as finite 
automata; these automata are then shuffled to obtain the workflow model. Based on the 
dependencies (business rules) undesirable states and strings are identified and by 
removing the undesirable states and strings for the workflow model, acceptable behavior 
of the workflow is determined. But in this technique there is no mechanism that enforces 
the correctness conditions i.e. enables or disables the events in the workflow model, 
based on dependencies to determine the acceptable behavior. 
 
 In state avoidance and string avoidance techniques we have considered that all the 
events are controllable.  But this is not true for all the workflow applications, if the event 
requires a processing entity then that event is uncontrollable as describe in Section 1.1.  
  
 To illustrate the effect of uncontrollable events, we will use the airline example 
with only one dependency (Abort dependency). According to the task structure describe 
in Section 1.1, events pca and aa are executed by the processing entity, hence 
uncontrollable.  Figure 4.13 shows two task, namely, airline reservation and hotel 
booking with uncontrollable events and Figure 4.14 shows the workflow model. 
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2
3
4 5
 
 
Figure 4.13. Task with Uncontrollable Events 
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Airline task 
· Sc: {sta, faa, ca}  Su: {pca, aa} 
Hotel task 
· Sc: {sth, fah, ch}  Su: {pch, ah} 
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(2,4) (3,4)
(5,2)
(5,3)
(4,2)(3,2)
(4,3)(3,3)
(3,5)(2,5)
aa
faasta
chch
Uncontrollable events
 
 
Figure 4.14. Workflow Model Gah with Uncontrollable Events 
 
· Abort Dependency (AD): if task ta aborts then task th aborts, 
· Incompatible or illegal state set:  (sa, s’h) task ta is in abort state and task th is in 
commit state (4, 5). 
 
 To determine the controlled behavior (generator model) we remove illegal state 
(4, 5) and disable events aa, faa, ch that leads to state (4, 5). But event aa is uncontrollable 
so it cannot be disabled, hence to calculate the controlled behavior the workflow model 
should be prevented from reaching the state (2, 5) from which event aa is generated. So to 
prevent the workflow from reaching state (2, 5) event ch, sta needs to be disabled. 
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   The point what we want to illustrate is that, even for a simple example with single 
dependency, uncontrollable events can very rapidly complicate finding the desired model. 
Hence formal methods are required to solve complex problems with uncontrollable 
events. 
 
 In avoidance techniques only tasks are modeled as automata and not the 
dependencies. The dependencies are specified in everyday language and based on this 
illegal state and illegal strings are identified, which preclude the ability to calculate the 
desired models automatically.  
 
 In order to address the fore-mentioned issues, we use supervisory control theory 
for modeling and analysis of workflows. In supervisory control theory both controllable 
and uncontrollable events are distinguish and control-flow dependencies can be modeled 
as finite automata, which can be directly coupled with uncontrolled process model to 
calculate the desired model. 
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Chapter 5 
Supervisory Control Theory 
 
 Supervisory control theory has two distinct entities: the uncontrolled process 
model and the supervisor. The uncontrolled process model is any system that needs to be 
controlled, where as a supervisor is an agent that enforces correctness conditions, by 
enabling or disabling the controllable events in the uncontrolled process model [23, 24].  
The basic idea of Supervisory control theory can be understood with the help of Figure 
5.1 [2].  
  
 
 
Figure 5.1. Supervisory Control Theory 
 
The uncontrolled process model generates a set of sequence of events. This set is 
referred as the language generated by the uncontrolled process model L(G) as shown in  
Figure 5.1. Once a set of control specifications C are imposed on the uncontrolled process 
model, some of the sequences in L(G) will no longer be acceptable i.e. the system is now 
required to operate in the shaded region in Figure 5.1. Language La is the admissible or 
desired language for the system. For example, the sequence ws is in language L(G) but it 
is not acceptable with respect to language La . Hence to keep the generated sequence of 
events within the shaded region of Figure 5.1, event s needs to be disabled when the 
system is at state qj. It is the function of the supervisor to disable event s to keep the 
system behavior within the boundaries of the specification language La  [2]. 
L(G) 
s w 
q 
i q j 
La 
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In this chapter Section 5.1 provides formal definitions and an overview of 
supervisory control theory; Section 5.2 illustrates the technique of supervisory control 
theory to model workflow processes. 
 
5.1 Formal Definition 
 
 A symbol s represents an event in a system. A string w is a finite sequence of 
events that take place in a system. An alphabet S is a finite set of symbols. A language L 
is a set of strings from some alphabet. A finite automaton is formally defined by a five-
tuple: 
G= (S, Q,d, qo, Qm), 
 
Where Q is the set of states q, S is a finite alphabet of events,  d: S x Q®Q is the 
transition function, qoÎQ is the initial state and QmÍQ is the set of marked (final) states. 
 
· L(G) = {w| wÎS*, d(w,q0)ÎQ is defined}, where w is a string and S* is the set of 
all strings over the alphabet  S.  In other words L (G) is the set of all possible 
sequences of events (strings) which take the initial state to some reachable state in 
Q. 
 
· Lm(G) = {w| wÎS*, d(w,q0)ÎQm }.  Lm(G) is the marked language generated by G 
which represents the sequence of events that take the initial state to some marked 
(final) state, Qm.  
 
In supervisory control theory [23], the uncontrolled process behavior is described 
by a finite automaton that is modified to accept controls. This is done by defining a set of 
events, ScÍS, which accept control. Those events that are uncontrollable are represented 
by Su, S = S Su cÈ and Su ÇSc = Ø. A supervisor is an agent that enables or disables 
controllable events in the uncontrolled process model such that the language generated 
satisfies some specifications. Formally the supervisor consists of a finite automaton S and 
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an output function Y(control pattern). S=(S, Y), where: S= (S, C, x, xo, Cm) and y:S x 
C®(0:disable, 1: enable) such that y(s,x)= 0 or 1 if  sÎSc and 1 if sÎSu . 
 
      The supervisor and the uncontrolled process model are coupled to form a closed 
loop system. Assume that at a given time the uncontrolled process model is in state qi and 
the supervisor is in state xj. An event sÎS can occur in the uncontrolled process in state 
qi. According to the state xj only a subset of the sÎSc may be permitted by the supervisor 
based on the control patterny. This concept of a closed loop system is illustrated in 
Figure 5.2 [23]. 
      
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.2.  Closed Loop Coupled System 
 
The closed loop system is denoted by S/G. Two languages generated by S/G are 
of interest. 
 
· L(S /G)= L(S) Ç L(G) is the sequences of events of the closed loop system, 
· Lm(S /G)= Lm(S) Ç Lm(G) is the marked sequences of events of the closed loop 
system. 
 
The basic problem in supervisory control is to restrict the behavior of the 
uncontrolled process model G in order to stay inside the admissible behavior as shown in 
Figure 5.1. The basic supervisory control problem and the solution to the basic 
supervisory control problem is formally discussed in Section 5.1.1. 
 
 
Control Pattern 
Event sÎS 
Uncontrolled 
Process Model 
Supervisor  
y(s,x) 
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5.1.1 Basic Supervisory Control Problem (BSCP) 
 
Consider DES G with event set E, uncontrollable events set Euc Í E, and 
admissible marked language La= aL  Í L(G),  find a supervisor S such that [4]. 
 
· Condition 1: L(S /G) Í La 
· Condition 2: Lm(S /G) is maximally permissible 
 
Where, aL is the prefix closure of La. The prefix closure of any language L is the 
language denoted by L  and consisting of all the prefixes of all the strings in L [4]. 
 
5.1.1.1 Solution of BSCP 
 
The solution for basic supervisory control problem according to the 
Controllability Theorem (CT) is to choose S such that [4]: 
 
=)/( GSL CaL
­  
 
as long as Æ¹­CaL . S can be realized by building a recognizer of 
C
aL
­  that is an 
automaton whose marked language is CaL
­ . The recognizer for CaL
­  can be build from La by 
using the algorithm for Computation of 
C­
, which is provided in Appendix (B) [4].  
 
 If we obtain CaL
­ =Æ, then this is not an allowed control behavior. This means that 
there exist a string of uncontrollable events from the initial state of G that does not belong 
to La. 
 
 
 
 
 
 47 
5.1.1.2 Controllability Theorem (CT) 
 
Theorem 1 [4]: Consider DES ),,,,( 0 mxxQEG d=  where Euc Í E is the set of 
uncontrollable events. Let the language CaL
­ Í L(G) where La¹Æ. There exists a 
supervisor S such that for G such that: 
 
L (S/G) = CaL
­   
 
If and only if the following condition holds: 
 
· CaL
­ Su Ç L (G) Í CaL
­  
 
Proof : For the proof refer to [4]. 
 
In the basic supervisory control problem (BSCP) blocking is not considered. A 
system is said to be blocked if it reaches a state from where no further events can be 
executed i.e. If a uncontrolled process model G reaches a state x where d  (x) = Æ and x 
Ï  Xm. We can also say that the system is blocked because it enters a deadlock state 
without having terminated the task at hand. Another issue is when uncontrolled process 
model G enters a set of states that forms a strongly connected component and no 
transitions going out of the set.  Since there is no way out of this set, the system is 
blocked due to livelock. Hence for a system that requires nonblocking behavior, blocking 
must be considered in the supervisory control problem.  
  
In basic supervisory control problems when blocking is of concern, the admissible 
behavior is obtain from Lm(G) and it is required that a supervisor is nonblocking. The 
admissible behavior for basic supervisory control problem where blocking is of concern 
is denoted by Lam as it is a sublanguage of marked languages [4]. 
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5.1.2 Basic Supervisory Control Problem – Nonblocking Case (BSCP-NB) 
 
Consider DES G with event set E, uncontrollable events set Euc Í E, and 
admissible marked language Lam Í Lm(G), with Lam assumed to be Lm(G) closed, find a 
nonblocking supervisor S such that [4]. 
 
· Condition 1: Lm(S /G) Í Lam 
· Condition 2: Lm(S /G) is maximally permissible 
 
5.1.2.1 Solution of BSCP-NB 
 
According to Nonblocking Controllability Theorem (NCT), the solution to the 
supervisory control problem when the behavior required is nonblocking is to choose S 
such that [4]:  
( / )    and   ( / )C Cam m amL S G L L S G L
­ ­= =  
 
as long as CamL
­ ¹ Æ . It is important to note that since Lam is assumed to be Lm(G) closed 
then CamL
­ is also Lm(G) closed which guarantees that:  
( / ) Cm amL S G L
­=  
Whenever  
( / ) CamL S G L
­=  
S can be realized by building a recognizer for CamL
­ . The recognizer for CamL
­  can be build 
from Lam by using the algorithm for Computation of C­ , which is provided in Appendix 
(B) [4].  
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5.1.2.2 Nonblocking Controllability Theorem (NTC) 
 
Theorem 2 [4]: Consider DES ),,,,( 0 mxxQEG d=  where Euc Í E is the set of 
uncontrollable events. Let the language CamL
­  Í Lm(G) where CamL
­  ¹Æ. There exists a 
nonblocking supervisor S for G such that: 
 
Lm(S /G) = CamL
­        and       L (S/G) = CamL
­   
 
If and only if the following conditions hold: 
· Condition 1: Controllability: CamL
­ Su Ç L (G) Í CamL
­  
· Condition 2: Lm(G)-closure: CamL
­  = CamL
­ Ç Lm(G) 
Proof: For the proof refer to [4]. 
 
· Definition 9: Controllability:  A language La is said to be controllable if aL Su Ç L 
(G) Í aL . This means, given a string w, which is a prefix of La, if we add an 
uncontrollable event s Îåu  such that ws Î L G( ) . Then if adding event s does 
not causes the string to exit from the prefix closure aL , then L is said to be 
controllable [2] 
· Definition 10: Lm(G)-closed : A language L is said to be Lm(G)-closed if L = L Ç 
Lm(G). This mean, the intersection of prefix closure L  and Lm(G) is same as L  
 
Example Lm(G)- closed: Consider a system with states (1, 2, 3, and 4) and events (a, b, c, 
and d) as shown in Figure 5.3(a). In this system state 4 is a marked state and state 1 is 
initial state. Once the control specifications are imposed, event c is undesirable and hence 
removed as shown in Figure 5.3(b).  
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(a) (b) 
Figure 5.3. System for Closure 
 
· L (G) = {a, ab, c, ad} 
· Lm (G) = {c, ad} 
· La = {a, ab, ad} 
· aL = {a, ab, ad} 
· Lam = {ad} 
· amL = {a, ad} 
 
A language La is not Lm (G) closed as   La ¹ aL Ç Lm(G). Whereas Language Lam is 
Lm (G) closed as Lam = amL Ç Lm(G). 
 
5.2 Applying Supervisory Control to Workflow Processes 
 
Considering the airline example explained in Section 3.3 which consists of 
following tasks and inter-task dependencies.  
 
· Task 1 - Purchasing an airline ticket (ta), 
· Task 2 - Booking a hotel (th), and  
· Dependency 1: Booking of hotel cannot start until purchasing an airline ticket 
starts (ta BD th). 
1 2 
4 
a 
d c 
3 b 1 2 
4 
a 
d 
3 b 
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· Dependency 2: If hotel booking aborts then purchasing airline ticket must aborts 
too (th AD ta). 
 
5.2.1 Uncontrolled Process Model 
 
 Both tasks ta and th are modeled as separate automata Ga and Gh as shown in 
Figure 5.4 and these automata are then shuffled to get the uncontrolled process model G 
= Ga ||  Gh as shown in Figure 5.5. 
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Figure 5.4. Individual Task Automata 
 
Airline task 
· Sc: {sta, faa, ca}  Su: {pca, aa} 
· Q: {ina, exa, dna, aba, cma} 
· d : {(sta x ina        exa), (pca x exa         dna), (aa x exa         aba), (ca x dna        cma),  
· (faa x dna         aba)}         
· qo : {ina} 
· Qm: { ina, aba, cma} 
 
Hotel task 
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· Sc: {sth, fah, ch}  Su: {pch, ah} 
· Q: {inh, exh, dnh, abh, cmh} 
· d : {(sth x inh        exh), (pch x exh      dnh), (ah x exh       abh), (ch x dnh      cmh),  
             (fah x dnh        abh)} 
· qo: {inh} 
· Qm: { inh , abh, cmh} 
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Uncontrollable events
        Initial State
       Marked State  
 
Figure 5.5.Uncontrolled Process Model (G) 
 
5.2.2 Admissible Language 
 
In workflow processes a workflow model should have certain properties, such as 
it should be safe and deadlock free. A workflow is safe if it terminates in a compatible or 
marked state. Whereas, a workflow model is deadlock free if from any state by allowing 
a sequence of events it is possible to reach some final state (marked state). To satisfy the 
property of safety and deadlock free, the workflow model should be nonblocking i.e. a 
basic supervisory control problem where blocking is of concern (BSCP-NB). 
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The solution for this problem according BSCP-NC as explained in Section 5.1.2 is 
to choose a nonblocking supervisor S such that:  
 
( / )    and   ( / )C Cam m amL S G L L S G L
­ ­= =  
 
The existence of such a nonblocking supervisor is guaranteed If and only if the 
following conditions hold. 
· Condition 1: Controllability: CamL
­ Su Ç L (G) Í CamL
­  
· Condition 2: Lm(G)-closure: CamL
­  = CamL
­ Ç Lm(G) 
 
To check for the existence of nonblocking supervisor, we first compute the 
recognizer for CamL
­ , which is the supremal controllable sublanguage of Lam.  
 
5.2.3 Computation of  Lam 
 
The admissible behavior Lam is the intersection of marked language generated by 
the uncontrolled process model Lm(G) and the marked language generated by control 
specification Lm(C) i.e. Lam = Lm(G) Ç Lm(C). Control specification C is the shuffle 
product of individual control specification (dependency) automata Ci for dependency i. 
However it’s not easy to describe the control specification as a formal language at all 
times. A wrong specification model will lead to the construction of an incorrect 
supervisor [23, 24]. In order to automate this we develop control specifications for weak-
causal, strong-causal and precedence type dependencies which can be coupled directly 
with the uncontrolled process model to determine the admissible language and hence the 
supervisor. 
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5.2.3.1 Control Specification Models 
 
Control-flow dependencies involve two tasks and specify certain restrictions over 
the execution of these tasks based on precedence of events and combination of states that 
are not allowed at a given time. The set of incompatible states (combination of states not 
allowed at any given time) and precedence order arising from control-flow dependencies 
based on their type are listed in Table 5.1. 
 
Table 5.1. Dependency Specification 
Dependency Incompatible state Precedence order 
Strong-causal ( 'is , js )  is <= js  
Weak-causal ( is ,
'
js ) None 
Precedence None 
is <= js  
 
A task Ti has a set of states Qi and at any given point of time a task can be in only 
one state is iQÎ . Thus we define, all the states other than state is  as complementary 
states 
Ù
is  i.e. 
Ù
is = Q - is . Table 5.2 shows all is iQÎ  and its complementary state
Ù
is .  
 
Table 5.2. Complementary States 
is              exi                                   dni                                         cmi                                             abi            
Ù
is  
 ini, dni, cmi, abi         ini, exi , cmi, abi              ini, exi, dni, abi               ini, exi, dni, cmi   
 
Based on complementary states, a pair of tasks can be in one of the state sets 
(
Ù
is ,
Ù
js ), (
Ù
is , js ), ( is ,
Ù
js ), and ( is , js ).  The precedence relationships result in a situation 
where state set ( is , js ) can be reached from state set (
Ù
is , js ) or state set ( is ,
Ù
js ) by 
following a sequence of events (path), from which only one of the sequences is a legal 
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path.  In order to differentiate state set ( is , js ) that is reached from state set (
Ù
is , js ) and 
state set ( is ,
Ù
js ), state set ( is , js ) is modeled as two different nodes ( , )i js s  and 
( , )i js s respectively and an event ei is defined where d (
Ù
is , ei) = is . Figure 5.6 illustrates 
the transition graph of the control specification model for any control-flow dependency. 
For this transition graph by looking in Table 5.3 events ei and ej can be identified based 
on the type of dependency as illustrated in Section 5.2.3.1.  
 
Formally a control specification is described by a finite automaton C = (S,Y, z, yo, 
Ym) where S is a set of events, Y is a set of states, z is a transition function, yo is an initial 
state and Ym is a set of marked states. From Figure 5.6,  
 
å - ei,ej
å - ei
å - ej
å
å
ei ej
ei
ej
(Si, Sj) (Si, Sj)
(Si, Sj)
(Si, Sj)
(Si, Sj)
^
^
^^
_
_
Initial State
 
Figure 5.6. Structure for Control Specification 
 
Y: {(
Ù
is ,
Ù
js ), (
Ù
is , js ),( is ,
Ù
js ), ( , )i js s , ( , )i js s } 
S: i jå Èå = {bi, pci, ci, ai, fai, bj, pcj, cj, aj, faj}   
z: {(ei x (
Ù
is ,
Ù
js )® ( is ,
Ù
js )), (ej x (
Ù
is ,
Ù
js )® (
Ù
is , js )), (ei x (
Ù
is , js )® ( , )i js s ),  
    (ej x ( is ,
'
js )® ( , )i js s )} Where  and i i j je eÎ å Î å  
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Considering that all tasks start from their respective initial states and this state is 
included in state set (
Ù
is ,
Ù
js ), then the combined initial state of the specification is yo= 
{(
Ù
is ,
Ù
js )}.  
 
 The set of final (marked) states, Ym, are determined based on the types of 
dependencies. Generally, if none of the states included in a specification model state set 
violate the conditions that the dependency specifies, then the state is marked. Conversely, 
if any member of the state set is illegal (incompatible) or is reached through an illegal 
string then the state set is not marked.  
 
 In order to identify the illegal states and illegal strings based on the type of 
dependencies, we have provided Table 5.3 which can be used to construct the 
specification model for a given dependency. Table 5.3 lists a complete set of 
incompatible states, illegal strings event ei and event ej for all the control-flow 
dependencies.  
 
 In Table 5.3 ei is an event which takes the task ti from state 'is  to state is  and is 
defined as d ( 'is , ei) = is . Similarly ej is an event which takes the task tj from state
'
js  to 
state js  and is defined as d (
'
js , ei) = js , whereas illegal state and illegal string are 
explained in Section 3.3.3. In the next Sections 5.2.3.1.1 we describes the methodology to 
determine the specification models of Strong-causal, weak-causal and precedence type 
dependencies. 
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Table 5.3. Incompatible States and Illegal Strings 
Type of 
dependency 
Incompatible 
state or illegal 
state 
Illegal string ei ej 
Begin ( 'is , js ) Event ei from (
'
is , js ) bi bj 
Begin on commit ( 'is , js ) Event ei from (
'
is , js ) ci bj 
Begin on abort ( 'is , js ) Event ei from (
'
is , js ) ai, fai bj 
Serial ( 'is , js ) Event ei from (
'
is , js ) ci, ai, fai bj 
Terminating ( 'is , js ) Event ei from (
'
is , js ) ci, ai, fai cj, aj, faj 
Strong commit ( is ,
'
js ) None ci cj 
Abort ( is ,
'
js ) None ai, fai aj, faj 
Forced commit on 
abort 
( is ,
'
js ) None ai, fai cj 
Exclusion ( is ,
'
js ) None ci aj, faj 
Weak begin on 
commit 
None Event ei from ( 'is , js ) ci bj 
Weak abort None Event ei from ( 'is , js ) ai cj 
Commit None Event ei from ( 'is , js ) ci cj 
 
5.2.3.1.1 Strong–causal Dependency 
 
       Consider the begin dependency between tasks ti and tj (strong-causal dependency) 
which indicates that, task tj cannot begin execution until task ti has begun. For the begin 
dependency, Table 5.3 indicates that state ( 'is , js ) is an incompatible state which is a 
member of (
Ù
is , js ) and hence state (
Ù
is , js ) will not be marked. In order to determine if 
there is a state set which is reached by executing an illegal sequence of events (illegal 
string). We look into Table 5.3, which indicates that event ei from state ( 'is , js ) is an 
illegal string which is a member of (
Ù
is , js ). By executing event ei from (
Ù
is , js ) the only 
state set that can be reached in Figure 5.6 is ( , )i js s . Event ei corresponds to the bi event 
for this dependency. Since this is an illegal string, (task tj is in sj indicating task tj has 
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already begun before task ti, which violates the precedence constraint) state set ( , )i js s  is 
also unmarked. The resulting generator for the begin dependency is illustrated in Figure 
5.7.  
å - bi,bj
å - bi
å - bj
å
å
bi bj
bi
bj
(Si, Sj) (Si, Sj)
(Si, Sj)
(Si, Sj)
(Si, Sj)
Marked state
^
^
^^
_
_
Initial State
 
 
Figure 5.7. Control Specification Model (Begin Dependency) 
 
5.2.3.1.2 Weak-Causal Dependency 
 
 Consider an abort dependency between tasks ti and tj (weak-causal dependency) 
which indicates that, if task ti aborts task tj has to abort too. Table 5.3 indicates that state 
( is ,
'
js ) is an incompatible state which is a member of ( is ,
Ù
js ) and hence state set ( is ,
Ù
js ) 
will be unmarked. The resulting generator for the abort dependency is shown in Figure 
5.8. 
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å
å
(Si, Sj) (Si, Sj)
(Si, Sj)
(Si, Sj)
(Si, Sj)
Marked state
^
^
^^
_
_
Initial State
å - ai, fai, aj, faj å - aj, faj
ai, fai
ai, fai
aj, faj
aj, faj
å - ai, fai
 
 
Figure 5.8. Control Specification Model (Abort Dependency) 
 
5.2.3.1.3 Precedence Dependency 
 
Consider a commit dependency between tasks ti and tj (precedence dependency), 
which indicates that, if both task ti and tj commits, then task ti commits first. Table 5.3 
indicates that there is no incompatible state. However, there is a precedence order which 
signifies that there is an illegal string. Table 5.3 indicates that event ei from state ( is ,
'
js ) 
is illegal string, state ( is ,
'
js ) is a member of (
Ù
is , js ). By executing event ei from (
Ù
is , js ) 
the only state set that can be reached in Figure 5.6 is ( , )i js s . Event ei corresponds to the ci 
event for this dependency. Since this is an illegal string, (task tj is in cj indicating task tj 
has already committed before task ti, which violates the precedence constraint) hence 
state set ( , )i js s  is also unmarked. The resulting generator for the commit dependency is 
illustrated in Figure 5.9.  
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Figure 5.9. Control Specification Model (Commit Dependency) 
 
In Section 5.2.3.1 we have introduced the methodology for building the 
specification models.  In the next Section we use this methodology to develop the 
specification model for the airline example explained in Section 5.2. 
 
5.2.3.2 Specification Model for Airline Example  
 
 The specification model consists of the dependencies between pairs of tasks. Each 
dependency i is modeled as finite automata Ci. The automata representing the individual 
specification for begin and abort dependencies (Ca and Cb) between tasks ta and th are 
shown in Figure 5.10(a) and 5.10(b) respectively. These automata are then shuffled to 
obtain the specification model C as depicted in Figure 5.11.   
å 
å 
(S i , S j ) (S i , S j ) 
(S i , S j ) 
(S i , S j ) 
(S i , S j ) 
Marked 
 
^ 
^ 
^ ^ 
_ 
_ 
Initial 
State 
å - c i , c j å - c j 
å - c i 
c i 
c i 
c j 
c j 
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ba bh
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(Si, Sj) (Si, Sj)
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^
^
^^
_
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 (a) Begin Dependency 
å
å
(Si, Sj) (Si, Sj)
(Si, Sj)
(Si, Sj)
(Si, Sj)
Marked state
^
^
^^
_
_
Initial State
å - ah, fah, aa, faa å - aa, faa
ah, fah
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aa, faa
aa, faa
å - ah, fah
 
(b) Abort Dependency 
 
Figure 5.10. Specification Model 
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Figure 5.11. Total Specification Model (C = Ca ||  Cb) 
 
Once the uncontrolled process model and specification model are determined, the 
next step is to couple uncontrolled process model and specification model to obtain the 
admissible language Lam = Lam (C /G) = Lm (C) Ç Lm (G). The recognizer for admissible 
language Lam is shown in Figure 5.12.  
 
 
 
 
 63 
(1,1) (2,1)
ta
th
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ah
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ca
        Initial State
       Marked State
 
Figure 5.12. Recognizer for Lam 
 
5.2.3.3 Recognizer for CamL
­   
 
The recognizer for CamL
­  is supremal controllable sublanguage of Lam. The supremal 
controllable sublanguage refers to maximum permissible language with respect to the 
admissible language. The supremal language cLam
­  can be computed using the algorithm 
[4]. This procedure is well understood with the help of Figure 5.13 and the algorithm is 
included in Appendix B. 
L(G)
w
 
(5, 2)
 
(5, 4)
ah
ca
 
­
amL
amL
(3, 2)
 
Figure 5.13. Supremal Sublanguage 
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Initially, the admissible language for the system is Lam = Lm(C/G). However, at 
state (5, 2) the supervisor cannot prevent the system from crossing the boundaries of the 
admissible language Lam since ah ÎSu. Hence, the idea is to prevent the system from 
entering in to state (5, 2). In Figure 5.13 state (5, 2) is accessible from states {(5, 1), (3, 
3)} by an events ca, bhÎSc.  Since events ca, bh are controllable events, these can be 
disabled by the supervisor at states (5, 1), (3, 3) so that state (5, 2) is not reached. Once 
the system is prevented from reaching state (5, 2) there can be some states in the system 
which are blocked. For example if we remove state (5, 2) it is not possible to reach any of 
the required marked states of the coupled model from state (5, 4). Hence a trim operation 
is done which removes all the states that are not reached from initial state or states from 
where some final state cannot be reached. The trim operation is described in Section 
4.4.1. According to this iterative procedure, admissible language Lam is reduced to a 
supremal controllable sublanguage cLam
­ shown by the shaded region in Figure 5.13. The 
recognizer for cLam
­ is shown in Figure 5.14, that excludes states (5, 2) and (5, 4).  
(1,1) (2,1)
ta
th
(3,1) (4,1) (5,1)
(2,2)
(4,4)
(4,5) (5,5)
(2,3)
(2,4) (3,4)
(5,3)
(4,2)(3,2)
(4,3)(3,3)
(3,5)(2,5)
Uncontrollable events
        Initial State
       Marked State
 
Figure 5.14. Recognizer for )/( GCcLam
­
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5.2.3.4 Existence of Supervisor  
 
To test for the existence of a nonblocking supervisor we check supremal 
controllable sublanguage )/( GCcLam
­
 for controllability and Lm(G)-closure conditions 
described in Section 5.2.3. If both these conditions are satisfied, then there exists a 
nonblocking supervisor S such that: 
 
 L(S/G) = )/( GCcL am
­  and  Lm(S/G) = )/( GCcL am
­  
 
The controllability condition depends on the system under consideration i.e. the 
admissible behavior )/( GCcLam
­
. If we obtain )/( GCcLam
­
=Æ, then there exist a string 
of uncontrollable events from the initial state of G that does not belong to )/( GCLam  i.e. 
there exist a dependency or combination of dependencies among tasks that are 
inconsistent.  
 
Whereas if ¹­ )/( GCcL am Æ, the condition of controllability is satisfied i.e. given 
a string w, which is a prefix of )/( GCcL am
­ , if we add an uncontrollable event s Îåu  
such that ws Î L G( ) , then adding event s does not causes the string to exit from the 
prefix closure )/( GCcLam
­ . 
 
Lm(G)-closure condition depends on the construction of the admissible behavior. 
When the admissible behavior is “ admissible marked behavior” then it satisfy Lm(G)-
closure condition. The following points support this argument [4]. 
 
· Marking is the property of the uncontrolled process model G, modeled by proper 
construction of Qm. 
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· Specifications are stated in term of marked languages Lm(C), as described in 
Section 5.2.3.2. 
· The admissible marked language is obtained by forming Lam= Lm(C) Ç Lm(G). 
· Such a Lam is guaranteed to be Lm(G)-closed, since amLÎ"w  and )(GLmÎw . 
 
Since ¹­ )/( GCcL am Æ as shown in Figure 5.14 and the admissible behavior is 
marked i.e. Lam= Lm(C) Ç Lm(G) as describes in Section 5.2.3.2 the condition of 
controllability and Lm(G)-closure are satisfied. There exist a supervisor S such that.  
 
L(S/G) = )/( GCcLam
­
 and Lm(S/G) = )/( GCcLam
­
 
 
5.2.4 Supervisor  
 
The supervisor S consists of a finite automata S and an output function Y(control 
pattern) as describe in Section 5.1. The finite automaton S is the automaton generated by 
)/( GCcLam
­
i.e. the recognizer for )/( GCcLam
­
. Whereas the output function Y (control 
pattern) for the supervisor is calculated for the states of S and events sÎSc (set of 
controllable events). Based on the control pattern Y, the supervisor disables the 
controllable events such that the uncontrolled process model satisfies the language 
)/( GCcL am
­ . The control pattern for the supervisor is shown in Table 5.4 which is in the 
form of 0 and 1 (0: disable, 1: enable).  
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Table 5.4. Control Pattern 
 ba afa ca bh afh ch 
(1, 1) 1 - - 0 - - 
(2, 1) - - - 1 - - 
(3, 1) - 1 0 1 - - 
(4, 1) - - - 1 - - 
(2, 2) - - - - - - 
(3, 2) - 1 0 - - - 
(4, 2) - - - - - - 
(2, 3) - - - - 1 - 
(3, 3) - 1 1 - 1 1 
(4, 3) - - - - 1 1 
(5, 3) - - - - 0 1 
(2, 4) - - - - - - 
(3, 4) - 1 0 - - - 
(4, 4) - - - - - - 
(2, 5) - - - - - - 
(3, 5) - 1 1 - - - 
(4, 5) - - - - - - 
(5, 5) - - - - - - 
* The events for which the control patter is marked ‘-‘means that the event has no restriction in that state. 
 
Consider state (1, 1) in Table 5.4 at which event bh = 0, which means when the 
uncontrolled process model reaches state (1, 1) the supervisor disables the event bh to 
keep the uncontrolled process model under the specified behavior  ( / )CmL C G
­ i.e. the 
supervisor prevents hotel booking task th to start before airline reservation task ta starts. 
 
Similarly consider state (3, 4) which represents a state when airline task is in its 
done state and hotel task is in abort state. At state (3, 4) event ca= 0 as Shown in table 5.4, 
which is the commit event of the airline task and is disabled. As this event ca takes the 
system to a state where airline task will be in commit state and hotel task is in its abort 
state, which is an incompatible state according to abort dependency between hotel task 
and airline task. 
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Chapter 6 
Case Study 
 
In this chapter online bookstores workflow architecture is illustrated, which is 
modeled using the supervisory control theory using the formalism described in chapter 5. 
 
6.1 Online Bookstore 
 
The workflow architecture for online bookstore is shown in Figure 6.1 which is 
centered around a workflow engine. The workflow components have application 
interfaces that provide standard means of communication between these components and 
the workflow engine. All workflow components have specific functions to perform in a 
workflow.  
 
· The Process Definition Tool is used at design stage to specify the process. Process 
definition contains information regarding the tasks, its starting and completion 
conditions, and rules and dependencies for navigating between tasks. 
· The Administration and Monitoring Tool are used for managing users, roles, 
security policy and for tracking and reporting workflow states and data 
generation.  
 
 The workflow engine reads the information from process definitions. This 
information is used by the engine to determine the step(s) to be performed and present 
them to the user through a user interface. The user then takes the appropriate action and 
notifies the workflow engine. Based on the user’s action the engine determines the future 
steps to be taken. When all the steps are completed, the workflow terminates.  
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6.1.1 Process Definition  
 
The online bookstore is a virtual company that has no books in stock. It has a pool 
of publishers who supply books to the online bookstore when ordered. The bookstore has 
access to these publisher’s databases. The customer places an order (Order) with the 
bookstore. The bookstore checks the availability of the book with a publisher by 
accessing the publisher’s database. If the book is available, the bookstore transfers the 
order to the publisher (Order Book). If the book is not available, the bookstore decides to 
search for an alternative publisher or rejects the order. At the same time the bookstore 
checks the credit card information provided by the user (Credit Card Authorization). If 
the book is available and the credit card information provided by the user is correct, the 
customer is informed and the bookstore continues to process the order. After ordering the 
books with the publisher, the bookstore searches for a shipper and sends a request to the 
shipper (Find Shipper). The shipper evaluates the request and either accepts or denies it. 
If the bookstore does not find a shipper or if the shipper cannot fulfill the request, the 
bookstore cancels the order with the publisher and notifies the customer (Cancel Order). 
If the shipper accepts the request, the publisher is informed. Then the publisher prepares 
the book for shipment and sends it to the shipper (Send Book to Shipper). The shipper 
prepares and ships the order (Ship Order). The shipper notifies online bookstore and the 
online bookstore or its billing company then processes the payment (Process Payment).  
 
We have identified the following eight tasks in this workflow. 
· Task 1: Order  
· Task 2: Credit Card Authorization 
· Task 3: Order Book (publisher) 
· Task 4: Find Shipper  
· Task 5: Send Book to Shipper  
· Task 6: Cancel Order (Publisher) 
· Task 7: Ship Order  
· Task 8: Process Payment 
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To comply with business policies and customer preferences, we identify certain 
constraints within the workflow. These constraints; represented in the form of inter-task 
dependencies are as follows. 
 
· Credit Card Authorization cannot start until Order Placement starts (T2 BD T1). 
· Order Books with publisher cannot start until Order Placement starts (T3 BD T1). 
· If Credit Card Authorization aborts then Ordering Books with publisher must 
aborts too (T2 AD T3). 
· Ordering Books with publisher cannot commit or abort until Credit Card 
Authorization either commits or aborts (T3 TD T2). 
· Send Book To Shipper cannot begin executing until Order Books with publisher 
either commits or aborts (T5 SD T3). 
· Find Shipper cannot start until Order Placement starts (T4 BD T1). 
· If Find Shipper task aborts then Send Book To Shipper task must abort (T4 AD 
T5). 
· If both Find Shipper task and Send Book To Shipper task commits, then find 
shipper task commits first (T4 CD T5). 
· Cancel Order of books with publisher cannot begin executing until Find Shipper 
aborts (T4 BAD T6). 
· If Find Shipper task aborts then task Cancel Order of books with publisher 
commits (T6 FCAD T4). 
· Ship Order Task cannot begin executing until Send Book To Shipper task either 
commits or aborts (T7 SD T5). 
· Ship Order Task cannot begin executing until Find Shipper task either commits or 
aborts (T7 SD T4). 
· Process Payment task cannot start until Ship Order Task starts (T8 BD T7). 
· If Process Payment task aborts then Ship Order Task must aborts too (T8 AD T7). 
· Ship Order Task cannot commit or abort until Process Payment either commits or 
aborts (T7 TD T8). 
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6.1.2 Online Bookstore Workflow 
 
 
 In this online bookstore workflow three parties namely online bookstore, 
Publisher and Shipper are involved. Consider the tasks executed by the online bookstore 
as shown in Figure 6.2. These tasks are. 
 
· Credit Card Authorization (T2) 
· Order Books (T3) 
· Find Shipper (T4) 
· Cancel Order (T6) 
 
 The dependencies between these tasks are listed above and shown in Figure 6.2 
[35]. The dependencies between these tasks are. 
 
· T2 AD T3 (C1) 
· T3 TD T2 (C2) 
· T4 BD T3 (C3) 
· T4 BAD T6 (C4) 
· T6 FCAD T4 (C5) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
Figure 6.2. Online Bookstore Workflow 
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6.1.3 Uncontrolled Process Model 
  
 The above-mentioned tasks are represented as finite state automata models. The 
uncontrolled process model (G), is the combined representation of all the tasks together, 
and is determined by taking the shuffle product of individual tasks as describe in Section 
6.2.1. 
 
 G = T2 || T3 || T4 || T6 
 
6.1.4 Specification Model 
 
 The inter task dependencies are modeled as finite state automata also and are 
referred as specification models. Similar to the tasks, individual dependency 
specifications are combined to form the total specification (C) as describe in Section 
5.2.3.2. 
 
 C = C1 ||C2 || C3 || C4 || C5 
 
 The admissible language is obtained by the couple product of specification C and 
the uncontrolled process model G i.e. Lam = Lm(C/G). 
 
The operations on the finite state automata such as Shuffle, Couple, finding the 
Supremal Sublanguage etc. were performed with the help of the software XPTCT 
designed by W.M. Wonham. 
 
6.1.5 Supervisor and Inconsistency 
 
We construct a nonblocking supervisor S such that: 
L(S/G) = )/( GCcLam
­
 and  Lm(S/G) = )/( GCcLam
­
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6.1.5.1 Inconsistent Supervisor 
 
The supremal controllable sublanguage )/( GCcLam
­
 is shown in Figure 6.3. 
This figure shows that only credit card authorization (T2) and order books with publisher 
task (T3) has executed.  This indicates the presence of a one or more dependency 
specification that is inconsistent with the given task structure between find shipper and 
cancel order task. In order to identify which dependency specification is inconsistent we 
have checked all the dependencies and the task structures involved in them individually 
and found that a combination of forced commit on abort dependency (FCAD) and begin 
on abort (BAD) between tasks Find Shipper and Cancel Order is inconsistent.  These 
dependency acts in the following way.  
 
· Begin on abort (BAD): Online bookstore looks for a shipper to ship the order to 
the customer. If a shipper is not available i.e. the Find Shipper task aborts, then 
cancel order task begin. This is depicted in Figure 6.4. 
· Forced commit on abort (FCAD): Online bookstore looks for a shipper to ship the 
order to the customer. If a shipper is not available i.e. the Find Shipper task 
aborts, then cancel order task should commit. However with the given task 
structure the cancel order task cannot be forced to commit. It can abort from its 
execution state due to an uncontrollable Abort event that leads the task to the 
aborted state. With the current task structure, after the order has been placed, the 
publisher can deny cancellation of an order. This is depicted in Figure 6.5. 
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Figure 6.3. Recognizer for )/( GCcLam
­
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6.4. Begin on Abort 
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Figure 6.5. Forced Commit on Abort 
 
In both forced commit on abort and begin on commit dependencies are combined 
i.e. if both FCAD and BAD are specified between find shipper task and cancel order task. 
The only feasible state is when both find shipper and cancel order tasks are in there initial 
states (1, 1) i.e. both find shipper and cancel order task can not execute.  
 
6.1.5.2 Modified Supervisor 
 
At this juncture there are two approaches that a company can adopt. The first 
approach is if the denial of the publisher to cancel the order is unacceptable, the terms of 
business agreement between the two concerned parties should be modified. In this case it 
means that the online bookstore can cancel the order with publisher at any point in the 
transaction, i.e. bookstore can force the Cancel Order task to commit. This involves 
adopting a different task structure. This task structure will not have an uncontrollable 
abort event a which can abort the cancel order task during its execution.  The current and 
the suggested task structure for Cancel Order are shown in Figure 6.6. 
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Figure 6.6. Cancel Order Task Structures 
 
 
 The second approach is to accept the current policy that cancellation of order 
cannot be forced to commit. This might result in losses for the company. With this 
approach the FCAD dependency between tasks Find Shipper and Cancel Order cannot be 
imposed.  The control pattern and the recognizer for the supervisor with this approach is 
shown in Table 6.1. 
Table 6.1. Control Pattern 
 b2 fa2 c2 b3 fa3 c3 b4 fa4 c4 b6 fa6 c6 
0 1 - - 0 - - 0 - - 0 - - 
1 - - - 0 - - 0 - - 0 - - 
2 - 1 1 0 - - 0 - - 0 - - 
3 - - - 1 - - 0 - - 0 - - 
4 - - - 1 - - 0 - - 0 - - 
5 - - - - - - 1 - - 0 - - 
6 - - - - - - 1 - - 0 - - 
7 - - - - 1 0 1 - - 0 - - 
8 - - - - - - 1 - - 0 - - 
9 - - - - - - - - - 0 - - 
10 - - - - 1 1 1 - - 0 - - 
11 - - - - - - 1 - - 0 - - 
12 - - - - - - - - - 0 - - 
13 - - - - 1 0 - - - 0 - - 
in  
ex  
ab cm  
c  
a  
pc  
fa 
dn 
 b 
1 
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Table 6.1 (Continued) 
 b2 fa2 c2 b3 fa3 c3 b4 fa4 c4 b6 fa6 c6 
14 - - - - - - - - - 0 - - 
15 - - - - - - - 1 1 0 - - 
16 - - - - - - - - - 1 - - 
17 - - - - - - 1 - - 0 - - 
18 - - - - 1 1 - - - 0 - - 
19 - - - - - - - - - 0 - - 
20 - - - - - - - 1 1 0 - - 
21 - - - -  - - - - 1 - - 
22 - - - - 1 0 - 1 1 0 - - 
23 - - - - 1 0 - - - 1 - - 
24 - - - - - - - 1 1 0 - - 
25 - - - - - - - - - 1 - - 
26 - - - - - - - - - 0 - - 
27 - - - - - - - - - - - - 
28 - - - - - - - - - 0 - - 
29 - - - - 1 1 - 1 1 0 - - 
30 - - - - 1 1 - - - 1 - - 
31 - - - - - - - 1 1 0 - - 
32 - - - - - - - - - 1 - - 
33 - - - - - - - - - 0 - - 
34 - - - - - - - - - - - - 
35 - - - - 1 0 - - - 0 - - 
36 - - - - 1 0 - - - - - - 
37 - - - - - - - - - 0 - - 
38 - - - - - - - - - - - - 
39 - - - - - - - - - - 1 1 
40 - - - - - - - - - - - - 
41 - - - - - - - 1 1 0 - - 
42 - - - - - - - - - 1 - - 
43 - - - - 1 1 - - - 0 - - 
44 - - - - 1 1 - - - - - - 
45 - - - - - - - - - 0 - - 
46 - - - - - - - - - - - - 
47 - - - - - - - - - - 1 1 
48 - - - - - - - - - - - - 
49 - - - - 1 0 - - - - 1 1 
50 - - - - 1 0 - - - - - - 
51 - - - - - - - - - - 1 1 
52 - - - - - - - - - - - - 
53 - - - - - - - - - - - - 
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Table 6.1 (Continued) 
 b2 fa2 c2 b3 fa3 c3 b4 fa4 c4 b6 fa6 c6 
54 - - - - - - - - - 0 - - 
55 - - - - - - - - -  - - 
56 - - - - 1 1 - - - - 1 1 
57 - - - - 1 1 - - - -   
58 - - - - - - - - - - 1 1 
59 - - - - - - - - - - - - 
60 - - - - - - - - - - - - 
61 - - - - 1 0 - - - - - - 
62 - - - - - - - - - - - - 
63 - - - - 1 - - - - - 1 1 
64 - - - - - - - - - - - - 
65 - - - - 1 1 - - - - - - 
66 - - - - - - - - - - - - 
67 - - - - - - - - - - - - 
68 - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
 
Consider begin event for order book task b3 in table 6.1. This event is disabled (b3 
=0) until the system reaches state 3 or state 4 i.e. until credit card authorization task either 
commits or aborts, order book task cannot begin. This is due to the terminating 
dependency between credit card authorization task and order book task which specifies 
that order book task cannot commit or abort, unless credit card authorization task 
commits or aborts.  
 
Similarly consider an abort dependency between credit card authorization task 
and order book task (T2 AD T3), which specifies that if credit card authorization task 
abort then order book task must abort too.  Hence at state 7, which represents that credit 
card authorization task is in abort state and order book task is in done state, event c3 is 
disabled, as this event takes the system to a state where credit card authorization task is 
aborted and order book task is committed which violates abort dependency between these 
task. 
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Chapter 7 
Conclusion and Future Research 
 
In this chapter: Section 7.1 lists the contributions of the research; Section 7.2 
conclusion of the research; Section 7.3 discusses future research directions. 
 
7.1 Contribution 
 
· We have modeled and analyzed the workflow process definition using the state 
avoidance and string avoidance techniques as described in Section 4.2 - 4.4 which 
provides insight to the modeling and control of workflow systems as DES. 
 
· The Methodology for modeling control-flow specifications (business policies) 
presented in Section 5.2.3.1 is a valuable contribution as this facilitates automatic 
design of workflow controllers. 
 
· We have provided a mathematical framework based on Finite Automata 
formalism for modeling, control and analysis of workflow process definitions. 
Within this framework uncontrolled events are considered and tasks, and 
dependencies are modeled separately leading to robust system design (Chapter 5). 
 
o The framework presented is independent of task structure and can be used 
with two-phase commit, one-phase commit and zero-phase commit task 
structures. 
 
o The framework facilitates identification of inconsistency in business 
policies as illustrated in Section 6.1.5.1. 
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o The existence of nonblocking supervisor for workflows show in Section 
5.2.3.4 is a valuable contribution as it facilitates computing the workflow 
model which guarantees certain desirable properties (deadlock free, 
livelock free and safe termination). 
 
7.2 Conclusion  
 
In this research, we have modeled workflows using Finite Automata. A finite 
automaton provides the basis for formal proofs that develops a higher confidence in the 
correctness of the workflow; it also facilitates analysis of the workflow, which reduces 
human error and cost of testing. 
 
More specifically, the workflow process definition is modeled using supervisory 
control theory, where both the uncontrolled process and the specification (business 
policies) are modeled separately and then combined to obtain the controlled process. If 
business policies are updated or new business policies are added, it is not necessary to 
remodel the system. Only the specification model needs to be modified. 
 
Several properties of supervisory control theory such as nonblocking, 
controllability, closure, accessibility and co-accessibility have been discussed. These 
properties are effectively used for identifying inconsistencies in business policies, testing 
for safe termination of the workflow (process) and checking for deadlocks and livelocks 
in the workflow.  
 
 In short; there is a need for standardization in the problem definition tool. The 
rapid increases in application domains that use workflow management systems; requires 
a formal framework that can be used by various workflow product developers to 
implement these applications. To achieve this goal we have provided a formal 
comprehensive framework for modeling a process definition, that can be used at design 
time for modeling and analysis of workflow applications 
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7.3 Future Research 
 
We have modeled the workflow processes using a centralized supervisory control 
architecture, where each dependency (specification) is expressed as finite automata and 
the specification model is generated by taking a shuffle product of individual dependency 
(specification) automata. However the result suffers from an exponential state space 
increase. For example, the shuffle product of n specification automata with each automata 
having m states, results in mn states.  
 
Similarly the uncontrolled process model is the shuffle product of individual task 
automata. Hence as the number of tasks increase, the uncontrolled process model suffers 
from a state space explosion. The point we want to illustrate is that centralized control 
architecture suffers from scalability. Moreover some of the systems are distributed, 
heterogeneous and autonomous in nature, and therefore do not lend themselves to 
centralized control. 
 
In this work we have dependencies (business policies) to described restriction on 
the execution of the workflow which are of control-flow type; however there can be other 
types of business policies that are based on the output value generated by certain task or 
some external factors such as time.  
 
The fore-mentioned computational complexity and state space explosion can be 
resolved by modeling the workflow as a modular and decentralized supervisory control. 
Whereas a workflow with business policies based on output value or time can be model 
using high-level finite automata formalism.   
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Appendix A: Types of Dependencies [5] 
 
· Begin Dependency (tj BD ti): task tj cannot begin execution until task ti has 
begun. 
 
· Abort Dependency (tj AD ti): if task ti aborts then task tj aborts. 
 
· Commit Dependency (tj CD ti): if both task ti and tj commit then the commitment 
of ti precedes the commitment of tj . 
 
· Strong Dependency (tj SD ti): if task ti commits then task tj commits. 
 
· Weak Abort Dependency (tj WAD ti): if task ti aborts and task tj has not yet 
committed then task tj aborts. In other words if task tj commit and task ti aborts 
then the commitment of tj precedes the abortion of ti. 
 
· Terminating Dependency (tj TD ti): tj cannot commit or abort until ti either 
commits or aborts. 
 
· Exclusion Dependency (tj ED ti): if task ti commits and task tj has begun executing 
then task tj aborts. 
 
· Forced Commit on Abort Dependency (tj FCAD ti): if task ti aborts then task tj 
commits. 
 
· Serial Dependency (tj SD ti): tj cannot begin executing until ti either commits or 
aborts. 
 
· Begin on Commit Dependency (tj BCD ti): tj cannot begin executing until ti 
commits.  
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Appendix A (Continued) 
 
· Begin on Abort Dependency (tj BAD ti): tj cannot begin executing until ti aborts. 
 
· Weak Begin on Commit Dependency (tj WBAD ti): if ti commits, tj can begin 
executing after ti commits. 
 
Table A1. Dependencies Classification [1] 
Precedence Dependencies Weak Causal Dependencies Strong Causal 
Dependencies 
Commit Strong Commit Begin on Commit 
Weak Begin on Commit Forced Commit on Abort Begin on Abort 
Weak Abort Exclusion Begin 
 Abort Serial 
  Terminating 
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Appendix B: Standard Algorithm for • C [4] 
 
This algorithm is used to compute the supremal controllable sublanguage as 
explained in Section 4.2.2.3.  The general description of the algorithm is as follows: 
 
The language M is generated by uncontrolled process model G i.e. L(G) = M. The 
language Lam Í M which is marked by automata H. The goal is to calculate 
C
amL
­  with 
respect to M and ucå where, ucå  is uncontrolled event set. 
 
 In step 1 H0 is first calculated, which is a recognizer for admissible behavior Lam. 
Step 2 is an iterative procedure, in this step for iteration number 1 the states of automata 
H0 is checked if any of the states violates the active event set constraint imposed by the 
controllability conditions describe in Section 4.1.2.2 and are deleted from automata H0. 
Then in Step 2.2 trim operation is performed on automata H0 which produces H1. The 
same procedure is repeated until Hi+1 = Æ or Hi+1= Hi. 
 
 If Hi+1 = Æ, the algorithm terminates at step 2.2 and CamL ­ = Æ, whereas if Hi+1= 
Hi the algorithm terminates at step 3 and CamL ­ = Lm(Hi+1). 
 
B.1. Step 0 
 Let G = (X, E, f, W, x0) be an automaton that generates M, i.e., L(G) = M. 
Let H = (Y, E, g,WH, y0, Ym) be such that Lm(H) = Lam and L(H) = amL , where it is 
assumed that Lam Í  L(G). 
 
B.2. Step1 
 Let H0 = (Y0, E, g0, WH0, (y0, x0), Y0,m) = H´G 
where Y0 Í  Y ´  X.  Treat all states of G as marked for the purpose of determining 
Y0,m.  
By assumption Lm(H0) = Lam and L(H0) = amL . 
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Appendix B (Continued) 
 
States of H0 will be denoted by pairs (y, x). 
Set i = 0. 
 
B.3. Step 2: Calculate 
 B.3.1 Step 2.1 
   'iY  = { })),(()(:),( xyxYxy Hiuci GÍSÇGÎ  
     '' | iii Ygg =          where the notation | stands for “ restricted to” 
     ',
'
, imimi YYY Ç=   
  
     B.3.2 Step 2.2 
    Hi+1 = Trim )),,(,,,( ',00
''
miii YxygEY . 
If Hi+1 is the empty automaton, i.e. (y0, x0) is deleted in the above           
calculation, then CamL
­ = Æ and stop 
  Otherwise, set  
              Hi+1 =: (Yi+1, E, gi+1, (y0, x0), Yi+1,m). 
 
B.4. Step 3 
 If Hi+1 = Hi, then  
   Lm(Hi+1) = 
C
amL
­ and L(Hi+1) = 
C
aL
­  
and STOP. Otherwise, set i       i+1 and go to Step 2. 
 
We make the following comment about step 1 above. By definition, a state of H0 
is marked if and only if the corresponding state of H is marked. This is because we want 
H0 to be equivalent to H and therefore state marking in G should not affect H0. If the 
given CamL
­  happens to be a subset of Lm(G), then the second component of all the marked 
states of H0 will be marked in G. 
